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ABSTRACT 
Processes are a fundamental component of most activities undertaken by humans. In 
software engineering and information assurance, in particular, it is important that 
processes be understandable, documented, and repeatable so as to ensure that the process 
outcomes are consistent and predictable.  This dissertation provides a novel approach to 
process creation, documentation, checking, and maintenance that applies mathematical 
formalism to the engineering of processes that rely in large measure on human decision-
making to advance the process flow.  However, the modeling approach is sufficiently 
general for application to any process.  This dissertation advances the state-of-the-art in 
software engineering by providing a formal computer-assisted end-to-end way to conduct 
requirements engineering.  This dissertation advances the state-of-the-art in information 
assurance by developing a systematic approach that makes the creation of security 
processes precise and uses formal methods to allow upfront validation and runtime 
verification of modeled processes.  This dissertation demonstrates the modeling approach 
through a case study of the Unified Cross Domain Management Office’s Cross Domain 
Solution Workflow process. 
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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Processes are a fundamental component of most activities undertaken by humans.  
According to Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, a process is “a particular 
method of doing something, generally involving a number of steps or operations” 
(Webster and Mckechnie 1983).  In software engineering and information assurance, in 
particular, it is important that processes be understandable, documented, and repeatable 
so as to ensure that the process outcomes are consistent and predictable.  The ability to 
formally represent and reason about human-based decision-making processes is a 
prerequisite for implementing these processes in information systems. 
Our research presents a novel approach to process creation, documentation, 
checking, and maintenance.  Our statechart assertion-based approach applies 
mathematical formalism to the engineering of processes.  We focus on human-based 
processes, that is, processes that rely in large measure on human decision-making to 
advance the process flow; however, this modeling approach is sufficiently general for 
application to any process. 
Our approach utilizes statechart-based formal process modeling as well as the use 
of embedded statechart assertions to ensure that modeled process adheres to stated 
requirements, thus providing traceability1 between the process requirements and the 
process implementation.  The formal nature of our approach can also help the process 
engineer to reason about the process.  We apply formal methods-based tools and 
techniques in our approach.  As Monin points out, formal methods provide us with a 
precise and unambiguous means of specifying and reasoning about the behavior of 
systems (Monin and Hinchey 2003).  Formal methods are most frequently used in the 
software engineering of highly automated security- and safety-critical systems.  However, 
our research demonstrates the use of formal methods to specify and reason about 
                                                 
1 We apply the IEEE 610.12-1990 definition of traceability stated as, “The degree to which each 
element in a software development product establishes its reason for existing; for example, the degree to 
which each element in a bubble chart references the requirement it satisfies.” 
 2 
primarily human-based processes, such as the process used by the U.S. government to 
implement, certify, and accredit cross domain solutions (CDS).  This process is titled the 
CDS Workflow and serves as a demonstrative exemplar of our modeling approach.   
The intent of our approach is to impart a high degree of precision to our 
understanding of the process, as well as to provide an automated means of validating that 
the process does what we expect it to do.  In addition, our approach provides for runtime 
monitoring of the process in execution.  Runtime monitoring is useful for both validation 
which is about answering the question, “Is our formal specification of the natural 
language description of the process correct?” as well as verification which is about 
answering the question, “Have we correctly implemented the process?”  Runtime 
monitoring is possible because one of the artifacts produced by our modeling approach is 
an executable representation of the process.  In essence, runtime monitoring uses an 
executable version of the process and assertions about the process to evaluate input 
scenarios and classify them as good or bad (Drusinsky 2006). 
We apply a particular technical solution, the TimeRover statechart-based 
modeling tool, to our exemplar process in order to demonstrate the technical feasibility of 
the approach. 
Not all processes require a fine-grain level of modeling, high level of fidelity, or 
formal specification.  For example, Netflix, Incorporated describes a process of rapid 
recovery from problems that directs employees to “just fix problems quickly” (Anon.).  
The philosophy behind this is that the company resides in a creative-inventive market 
where fixing problems is cheaper than preventing them vice a safety- or security-critical 
market where preventing problems is cheaper than fixing them (Hall 2005).  The 
company goes on to describe the difference between “good” and “bad” processes.  The 
“good” processes tend to be loosely defined (e.g., website push every two weeks rather 
than random) and would likely not benefit from the use of formal methods. 
In a number of arenas there is a need to seamlessly share and integrate 
information from multiple security domains via a ubiquitous sharing and arbitration 
mechanism—in systems that perform this function are defined as cross domain solutions 
 3 
(Committee on National Security Systems 2006).  At the same time, we must have the 
evidence necessary to ensure the prevention of inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or 
classified information.  Prior to September 2008 the U.S. government had an established 
process for the certification and accreditation2 (C&A) of high-assurance systems as 
delineated in Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 Policy, “Protecting 
Sensitive Compartmented Information within Information Systems” (Committee on 
National Security Systems 2006).  The entire C&A process was reviewed and revised as 
delineated in the Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503, “Information Technology 
Systems Security Risk Management, Certification and Accreditation” and the associated 
documents within the ICD 503 Framework (see Figure 1) (Director of National 
Intelligence 2008). 
 
Figure 1. ICD 503 Framework 
                                                 
2 Where applicable, definitions for information assurance related terms will be as specified in the 
Committee on National Security Systems Instruction No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary.  
Accordingly, certification refers to the comprehensive evaluation of security safeguards to support the 
accreditation process.  Accreditation is the formal declaration that an information system is approved by a 
designated authority to operate at an acceptable level of risk. 
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The ICD 503 C&A process is embedded within the CDS Workflow process 
described above.  We must be able to understand and ensure the rigorous application of 
the ICD 503 C&A process for high-assurance systems.  In doing so, we help build the 
evidence necessary for operating these systems at the highest levels of assurance.  
Currently, there is no rigorously defined mathematical model of the C&A process.  Our 
modeling approach provides a means of building such a mathematically rigorous model.  
The ICD 503 C&A process is the product of a series of transitional working groups to 
reformulate and unify the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence 
Community (IC) C&A processes.  The intent was to develop a single, federated process 
applicable to high-assurance information systems throughout the federal government.  
These working groups primarily consisted of domain experts in fields related to high-
assurance systems, such as: system certifiers and accreditors, high-assurance system 
vendors, and DOD and IC chief information officers.  The working groups used a 
combination of domain knowledge, tribal knowledge, best practices, and input from 
government information assurance (IA) and C&A communities, to develop the process 
(Niles 2002).  While this method can be an effective way of developing processes, in the 
domain of high-assurance system certification and accreditation, it is not enough. As 
Gabbar pointed out, formal representation provides a systematic framework to construct 
and validate the syntax of the underlying system towards building standard representation 
approaches (Gabbar 2006, 23).  Michael et al. show us that (see Figure 2) we can 
translate customer requirements to formal specification then employ validation and 
verification (V&V) throughout the development process in order to ensure that the model 
satisfies stakeholder expectations (Michael et al. 2011). 
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Figure 2. A Continuous V&V Process (From Michael et al. 2011) 
We have analyzed the CDS Workflow process in terms of our modeling approach 
and used the approach to develop a formal process model.  We do so using formal 
methods tools and techniques such as those described in (Drusinsky 2006; Gabbar 2006; 
Monin and Hinchey 2003).  The resultant model provides the level of formality necessary 
for rigorously applying the exemplar process.   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The significance of the problem is clear.  In order to understand fully a series of 
activities conducing to an end, especially when that end directly relates to the level of 
trust we place in high assurance systems, we must be able to rigorously articulate the 
process, consistently predict the process outcomes, and enforces requirements on the 
process.  In this section, we discuss the importance of formally modeling the CDS 
Workflow exemplar process as a means of demonstrating the significance of the problem. 
In order to implement, certify, and accredit systems for operation at the highest 
levels of assurance, we need to be able to both understand and trust in the process 
through which we implement, certify, and accredit those systems.  Ultimately, our work 
in defining a formal model of the CDS Workflow process helps build the evidence 
necessary to certify and accredit high-assurance CDS systems.  However, a well-defined, 
validated, and documented process is only enough to guarantee safety.  The reification 
(i.e., mapping) from the formal model to the implementation is also needed to guarantee 
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security properties.  In other words, validation and verification (V&V) of the process is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining a trusted system. 
The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) research group at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) has partnered with numerous defense research and 
development (R & D) organizations to develop a prototype system (see Figure 3) called 
Radiant Alloy that is capable of fusing data from multiple security domains into a 
comprehensive picture of the Maritime Domain. 
 
Figure 3. Proposed System Architecture 
In the prototype system, data sources and clients may reside within any of the 
possible security domains (e.g., UNCLASS, SECRET, TOP SECRET).  Therefore, in 
order to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of classified data (i.e., information leakage), 
the application server depicted in Figure 3 must prevent the unintended transfer of data 
between security domains.  At the same time, it must allow authorized down/upgrading 
and transference of data in order to supply those on the client-side with the most 
comprehensive MDA situational awareness (SA) picture available based on the client’s 
level of access as demonstrated in Figure 4 below.  In addition, there must be a means for 
providing anonymity to the suppliers of the data contained in the repositories. 
 7 
 
Figure 4. Access Restricted Based on Authorized Access Level of User 
Systems such as Radiant Alloy are critical to the future of MDA.  The United 
States and its allies and other groups requiring access to MDA information at a variety of 
levels need a fully developed, easily accessible, comprehensive picture of the maritime 
domain.  For example: the struggle against military and terrorist forces bent on attacking 
and destroying U.S. and allied forces, combating the illicit worldwide movement of 
human cargo (e.g., the slave trade and illegal immigration), and investigation and 
prevention of narcotics trafficking.  In order to realize this vision, information from all 
security domains must be accessible on an as-needed basis to those that require it and 
only within authorized security domains.  For example, in a scenario involving tracking 
and interdiction of a cargo ship suspected of carrying concealed weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or WMD components, numerous organizations participate in the 
effort.  These roles have different security levels and data requirements; yet, in order to 
work together they must be able to share data.  This effort would include numerous 
participants such as: port security guards enforcing entry point access controls, Coast 
Guard harbor patrol personnel in a law enforcement capacity, watch officers at one of the 
Coast Guard Regional Fusion Centers that deconflict and manage inbound shipping, ship-
refueling operators that routinely collect and analyze data on inbound shipping fuel 
levels, maritime patrol aircraft that contribute to maritime situational awareness, Naval 
carrier strike groups which routinely analyze the operating patterns of underway vessels, 
the U.S. State Department which understands normalized flow of trade between 
countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that may have unique insights and 
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access to activity at ports of debarkation worldwide, and any other organization that may 
be able to contribute to the tracking and interdiction of the target vessel.  
The governance of high-assurance systems C&A has transitioned to a series of 
publications that fall within a proposed framework for ICD 503 shown in Figure 1.  ICD 
503 is a result of a shift in responsibility for the C&A of high-assurance systems from the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  
The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO), under the auspices of the 
DNI, is responsible for creating, publishing, and maintaining ICD 503.  The intent of ICD 
503 is to combine current paths to C&A into a unified federal government-wide process.  
This is a major shift from today’s C&A environment where the process of C&A is 
dependent on the domain in which a system operates.  Furthermore, C&A via one system 
does not transfer or correlate to C&A via another.  For example, the Department of 
Defense uses DoD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2 to govern the C&A of information systems 
whereas the Intelligence Community (IC) uses DCID 6/3.  A cross domain solution fully 
certified under DODI 8500.2 would still need to go through the DCID 6/3 C&A process 
in order to be certified for use within the IC.  Under the rubric of ICD 503, a single C&A 
process will be used for all federal information systems.  
The ICD 503 framework establishes the authorities and structure for protecting 
national intelligence information and information systems, whether classified or 
unclassified (Director of National Intelligence 2008).  The Committee on National 
Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009 provides a common lexicon for discussing 
information assurance and national security systems (Committee on National Security 
Systems 2006).   
CNSSI 1199, a product of the U.S. Committee on National Security Systems, 
provides a means of categorizing U.S. national security systems in terms of the potential 





in Table 1, this categorization is broken down into three security objectives: 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.  Each of these is assessed in terms of 
information related to that security objective and the potential impact of its unauthorized 
disclosure.  
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Table 1. Potential Impact Definitions for Security Objectives (From National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 2004) 
 Potential Impact 
Security Objective Low Moderate High 
Confidentiality 
Preserving author-
ized restrictions on 
information access 
and disclosure, in-




[44 U.S.C. SEC. § 
3542] 
The unauthorized dis-
closure of information 
could be expected to 





ganizations, or the 
national security inter-
ests of the United 
States. 
The unauthorized dis-
closure of information 
could be expected to 





ganizations, or the 
national security inter-
ests of the United 
States. 
The unauthorized dis-
closure of information 
could be expected to 
have a severe or cata-




other organizations, or 
the national security 
















mation could be ex-
pected to have a lim-




other organizations, or 
the national security 





mation could be ex-
pected to have a seri-




other organizations, or 
the national security 
interests of the United 
States. 
The unauthorized mod-
ification or destruction 
of information could 
be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic 




other organizations, or 
the national security 
interests of the United 
States. 
Availability 
Ensuring timely and 
reliable access to 
and use of infor-
mation. 
[44 U.S.C., § SEC. 
3542] 
The disruption of ac-
cess to or use of in-
formation or an infor-
mation system could 
be expected to have a 
limited adverse effect 
on organizational op-
erations, organization-
al assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or 
the national security 
interests of the United 
States. 
The disruption of ac-
cess to or use of in-
formation or an infor-
mation system could 
be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect 
on organizational op-
erations, organization-
al assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or 
the national security 
interests of the United 
States. 
The disruption of ac-
cess to or use of in-
formation or an infor-
mation system could 
be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic 




other organizations, or 
the national security 
interests of the United 
States. 
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A security category is based on the potential impact of unauthorized disclosure of 
information residing on the system.  The security category is determined by the following 
equation: 
Security Category of information type = {(Confidentiality, impact), 
(Integrity, impact), (Availability, impact)}, where the acceptable values for 
potential impact are LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH as described in Table 1 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology 2004). 
If a U.S. system contains information at different impact levels, the highest 
impact level is used when determining the security category.  The U.S. government has 
adopted security labels based on a set of definitions for security objectives.  These are 
distinct from internationally developed and recognized definitions such as those 
contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.  For 
example, the CDS described earlier in this document is designed to interface with 
security domains from UNCLASSIFIED all the way up to TOP SECRET as shown in 
Figure 4.  Traditionally, information labeled TOP SECRET and above is given the 
highest levels of protection as unauthorized disclosure of this information has a HIGH 
potential impact on national security.  Therefore, the security category of this system 
would be (Confidentiality, H), (Integrity, H), (Availability, H).  Within the ICD 503 
Framework this would be referred to as an ICD 503 H-H-H security category. 
The successful culmination of our research provides a formalized, statechart-
based approach to human-based process modeling.  We demonstrate this approach using 
the largely human-based Cross Domain Implementation Process (CDIP) and CDS 
Workflow process as exemplars.  Through formal methods tools and techniques, we show 
that it is possible to rigorously define, monitor in execution, maintain, and enforce 
requirements on these processes.  A benefit of this approach is continuous monitoring of 
the process if we implement a runtime model of the process with assertions.  We further 
show that our modeling approach is generalizable to any process. 
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C. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND APPROACH 
1. Research Hypothesis 
We can extend the use of statechart assertions through the application of a process 
modeling approach, where: 
• The approach provides a systematic, formal methods-based procedure for 
precise development, debugging, runtime monitoring, long-term 
maintenance, and upfront validation and verification of decision-making 
processes. 
• Integrated statechart assertions serve as a requirements enforcement 
mechanism on the modeled process. 
We test our hypothesis vis-à-vis the application of the modeling approach to the 
CDIP and its successor the CDS Workflow process. 
2. Research Approach 
Using formal methods tools and techniques, we develop a systematic approach to 
process-modeling engineering.  This approach provides us with a systematic, repeatable 
basis for engineering, understanding, and assessing the security properties of processes 
developed with the modeling approach.  Formal models are a useful tool for helping us 
understand and clearly describe a system or process in unambiguous language.  Our 
modeling approach allows assertions to be exercised and visualized via animation.  This 
can be used as a communication tool for discussing the process and system with decision 
makers, process owners, management, and other stakeholders. 
The nature of the largely human-based CDIP and CDS Workflow process is such 
that it involves subjective and objective sub-processes.  By subjective, we mean 
processes that involve elements of human evaluation.  For example, evaluating the 
effectiveness of an authentication mechanism is a subjective process where the 
evaluator’s experience, knowledge, personal bias, and definition of the word 
“effectiveness” can affect the process outcome.  By objective, we mean processes that are 
repeatable, measurable, well structured, and produce predictable outputs for a given set of 
inputs.  For example, evaluating the strength of passwords is an objective process 
definable in terms of the computing power and time necessary to crack the passwords 
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successfully.  Figure 5 represents the CDS Workflow process as a composition of these 
subjective and objective sub-processes.  As part of our research, we break the CDIP and 
CDS Workflow down into its subjective and objective component parts.  We then use 
formal methods techniques to model the objective sub-processes in a well-defined formal 
language. 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual View of CDS Workflow Process 
As Monin points out, when a formal model is available, we can state with 
precision the properties we expect from the system (i.e., the system’s behavior) and then 
formally verify them (Monin and Hinchey 2003, 4).  Our approach to modeling provides 
for precisely stating the properties we expect from the objective components of the CDS 
Workflow process.  We assess the technical feasibility of our modeling approach in terms 
of its real-world applicability and provide us with a test case on a process being 
developed for managing and implementing CDS. 
D. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
1. Software Engineering 
We contributed to software engineering by introducing a novel way for software 
to automate a new domain, that being process-modeling engineering of high-level, 
human-based processes.   
2. Process-modeling Engineering 
We developed a systematic approach to formally modeling, validating and 
verifying high-level human-based processes.  Modeling human-based processes can be 
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challenging to model because of the hard-to-capture elements such as human decision-
making, sequencing, and concurrent activities.  We applied some of the tools and 
techniques from software engineering to provide an end-to-end means of modeling, 
validating, and verifying these processes within the same formalism. 
3. Case Studies 
We demonstrated the application of our systematic modeling approach through 
two case studies.  These two cases represent hard process modeling problems and 
encompass a large portion of the hard-to-capture elements mentioned above.   
4. Real-world Impact 
We provided feedback to the UCDMO on process errors discovered through the 
case studies, resulting in corresponding changes to the real-world process for requesting, 
developing, implementing, certifying and accrediting cross domain solutions.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter II we assess and discuss relevant literature.  In Chapters III and IV we 
describe and exposit the modeling approach and provide usage examples.  In particular, 
Chapter III provides a detailed description of the modeling approach and its applications 
while Chapter IV applies the modeling approach to two particular processes.  The final 
chapter (Chapter V) provides conclusions and a view into future research. 
 15 
II. RELATED RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long history of research on the modeling of software and security 
processes, such as those for development, maintenance, and in particular for V&V and 
C&A of software and information systems.  For example, the First International 
Conference on the Software Process held in Redondo Beach, CA in 1991.  At this 
conference, many papers were presented on the topic of formally modeling software 
engineering processes.  This conference was primarily focused on high-level processes 
such as those by which software is developed as opposed to low-level processes such as 
those managed by an operating system (e.g., memory or file management).  Subsequent 
to the conference, the field of formal process modeling continued to evolve not only for 
software engineering processes but also for business processes.  Researchers in both 
fields experimented with a wide variety of tools and techniques in the effort to find ways 
to formally specify, validate, and verify high-level software development and business 
processes.   
Additionally, a significant body of research exists on the development of 
executable process models from formal specifications.  However, a gap exists in the open 
literature with regard to conducting runtime verification of the executable process 
models.  Our work addresses this need by providing a systematic process modeling 
approach that includes runtime verification of the executable process model via 
embedded statechart assertions. 
B. FORMAL METHODS IN PROCESS MODELING 
Gruhn and Emmerich introduced a software process modeling language called 
FUNSOFT nets.  These are essentially Petri nets with a formally defined semantics in 
terms of Predicate/Transition (Pr/T) nets and extended by multi-sets (Emmerich and 
Gruhn 1991).  Gruhn describes software process modeling as focusing on software 
process models that can be used for governing software processes with the intent of 
automatically detecting incongruities between a software process and its associated 
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model.  Executable software process models, according to Gruhn, contribute to increased 
software development productivity and software quality.  The underlying Pr/T net 
contains a multiplicity of features that facilitate the specification and governance of the 
modeled software processes.  These features include the following: a set of jobs 
representing software development activity; a set of object type definitions that can be 
attached to channels via a specified function in order to specify the allowable type for a 
particular channel; a set of predicates to define conditions on the objects; and an initial 
marking that respects the typing of channels.  Gruhn extended the discussion of 
FUNSOFT nets to encompass social processes represented by software development 
teams (V. Gruhn 1992).  He points out that the incorporation of human social interactions 
into software process models represents an area of research that is not well understood 
though he does suggest that the dialogue artifacts inherit in FUNSOFT nets may provide 
a means of describing these interactions in the context of software processes (Emmerich 
and Gruhn 1991).  Gruhn concludes that the non-linear factors involved in human social 
interactions prevent the modeler from doing more than pointing out explicitly where 
human interaction and cooperation impacts software development.  
Hibdon and Hartrum examine the development of an organizational process 
model based on object-oriented design concepts and formal software engineering 
methods.  They apply a sequential design process that builds an informal Rumbaugh 
model, translates it to a Z based specification, and finally translates the Z specification 
into the Refine language and builds an executable model via the Software Refinery 
Environment (Hibdon and Hartrum 1996).  The translation of Z to Refine requires special 
attention with regard to Z predicate constraints since Refine does not support Predicate 
constraints that must always hold true.  Constraints of this type must be mapped into pre- 
and post-conditions of Refine functions.  In our modeling approach, the statechart-based 
model and the embedded assertions are designed with the same modeling techniques in 
the same formalized language. 
An experimental application of process modeling technology at the British 
Airways showed that there is value in using flexible modeling tools as the modeling 
process can reveal flaws and inconsistencies in the original process.  If this results in a 
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change to the original process, the model needs to be changeable to reflect the 
adjustments (Emmerich et al. 1996).  Our modeling approach addresses this issue by 
using a modeling tool that is flexible enough to apply rapid changes yet continues to 
ensure that the model maintains consistency with the underlying formal semantic. 
Business process models have become increasingly complex, making it steadily 
more difficult to implement the models within an information system.  Koehler et al. 
suggest a dichotomy exists between the tools and methods used to describe a business 
process and the tools and methods used to describe the information technology (IT) 
artifacts implementing the process.  They make the case that process requirements should 
be made explicit and demonstrate the use of basic model checking techniques to verify a 
model’s global properties of reachability and liveness.  These terms are defined as 
follows: the reachability property states a particular situation can sometimes be reached 
whereas a liveness property expresses that, under certain conditions, a situation will 
ultimately occur (Koehler, Tirenni, and Kumaran 2002).  Here, the term “global 
properties” refers to those properties that apply to the entire model.  While verification of 
these properties is useful in terms of a basic understanding of how the model behaves 
during enactment, they do not provide insight or enforcement for properties within the 
context of the model.  In other words, these properties are agnostic to the contents of the 
model.  Our research addresses the need for contextual verification of a model’s internal 
properties through the runtime application of embedded statechart assertions. 
Van Dongen, Van Der Alst, and Verbeek as well as Van Dongen and Jansen-
Vullers show that process-aware information systems are used to support a wide range of 
business processes.  Often, these systems are configured based on a process model which 
drives the need to ensure that the process model is correct.  Therefore, many researchers 
have investigated the verification of process definitions with a focus on the construction 
of mathematically sound and executable syntax and semantics of specific modeling 
languages.  In spite of the importance of having a correct process model the authors 
indicate that for many process-modeling techniques, mathematically well-defined syntax 
and semantics do not exist or they are too complex for process designers.  In order to 
demonstrate the value of modeling techniques based on a well-defined language, the 
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authors use the Event-driven Process Chains (EPC) modeling language to describe their 
approach for verification of EPCs.  Then, through a series of reductions, they translate the 
EPC to a form of the classic Petri net model known as Place/Transition nets which 
consist of two modeling elements.  Their stated goal is to provide the process designer 
with a tool to find possible problems in a process specification.  To that end, they require 
the process designer to interactively evaluate the EPC and Place/Transition model at two 
different points in the verification process in order to make decisions about the behaviors 
exhibited by the model.  (Van Dongen, Van Der Aalst, and Verbeek 2005; Van Dongen 
and Jansen-Vullers 2005)  This approach leads to what the authors describe as a relaxed 
definition of correctness that focuses on giving the process designer the ability to 
determine whether, according to his personal standards for the process resulting in 
desirable versus undesirable behaviors, a process under examination is correct.  
As pointed out by Gruhn and Lane, the building of business process models 
(BPM) can benefit from well-established practices in software engineering (V. Gruhn and 
Laue 2007).  The focus and main contribution of their research is a discussion of the 
value of style checking in improving the quality of BPM.  The authors suggest that 
significantly improving the quality of BPMs related to software development using style 
rules and style checking leads to an improvement in the quality and success of enterprise 
software development. 
Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) is an emerging standard that allows 
business processes to be captured in a standardized format.  BPMN lacks formal 
semantics which leaves many of its features open to interpretation and hinders 
verification of processes described in BPMN.  Ye et al. proposed a methodology for 
mapping a subset of BPMN elements to the Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) 
specification language formal, set-notation based definitions. (Ye et al. 2008)  The 
authors developed a tool for automated translation of a BPMN model to a YAWL net.  
While this tool required preprocessing and did encounter translation errors it provided an 
initial step toward the type of formalization required for BPMN model verification.  
However, it also highlights the challenges of taking a model developed in a language 
lacking formal semantics and translating that model to a sufficiently formal language to 
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allow verification.  Our modeling approach addresses this gap by allowing the process 
engineer to both design and verify process models within the same formal specification 
language. 
Grady offered a universal architecture description framework (UADF) and 
showed how this combination of UML and SysML can be applied to modern day 
problem spaces to provide organized methods for identification of specialty 
engineering/quality, environmental requirements, product entities, and the map between 
models and product entities borrowed from Traditional Structured Analysis (TSA) 
(Grady 2009).  He points out the difficulty in connecting a design with the verification 
process through which we prove that a design satisfies its driving requirements.  Our 
work in applying statechart-based assertions to the modeling of processes addresses this 
by modeling requirements in the same statechart-based notation as the modeled process 
and embedding those assertions within the modeled process so that they can be enforced 
at runtime. 
The integration of human interactions into process modeling can be challenging 
due to the unpredictable nature of human behavior.  It is important to find ways to 
formally specify human interactions within a process in order to facilitate process 
validation and verification.  Zongyang, Liyang, and Hongli propose a formalization of 
human interactions within business processes through the introduction of the Human 
Processes and Artifact (HP/A) model.  This model applies rigorous, set notation-based 
definitions to human processes combined with statechart visual representations of the 
human interactions within a business process.  However, the authors identify a gap in the 
verification of models that incorporate human interactions due to ability of humans to 
make unpredictable choices (Zongyan, Liyang, and Hongli 2010).  Our work contributes 
to closing this gap in human-based model verification by integrating the representation of 
human choices within the process models designed through our modeling approach.  As a 
result, requirements or constraints on human choices can be modeled and enforced at 
runtime using statechart embedded assertions within an executable model.  This 
facilitates runtime verification of models that integrate the representation of human 
choices. 
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Hurtado Alegria, Bastarrica, and Bergel point out that the software process 
models can be sophisticated and large.  The formal specification of these models 
demands an enormous effort and once specified, the process engineer lacks tools to 
evaluate the quality of the process.  They demonstrate the Analysis and Visualization for 
Software Process Assessment (AVISPA) tool for analyzing and identifying errors within 
software process models as an a priori way to measure the quality of the process prior to 
execution.  The authors point out that formal V&V techniques for measuring and testing 
discrepancies between a model and its execution can only be carried out on a process 
model that has been implemented, tailored, and enacted (Hurtado Alegría, Bastarrica, and 
Bergel 2010; Hurtado Alegría, Bastarrica, and Bergel 2011).  Our process modeling 
approach addresses this concern by providing the process engineer with an iterative 
approach to process design that integrates V&V throughout and includes the development 
of an executable representation of the process model. 
Karniel and Reich identified a gap between the process planning and process 
implementation communities.  They indicate that many new product development (NPD) 
projects fail.  The design structure matrix (DSM) can be used for planning and modeling 
the process flow of NPD projects.  However, DSM lacks the formality necessary to verify 
correctness of the process model.  The authors suggest a relationship between the NPD 
project failures and inability to verify the DSM model of the project.  They propose a 
complex series of formal rules to translate a DSM model to a workflow net.  Workflow 
nets are a class of Petri nets with the necessary formalisms and tools to conduct process 
verification.  The authors point out that their approach is difficult to implement for more 
complex DSM models. (Karniel and Reich)  Our work addresses this gap by providing a 
visual modeling language that is accessible to both the process planning and 
implementation communities yet includes the necessary formality and tools to enable 
V&V of the modeled process. 
Human interactions are an integral component of business processes.  However, 
as Stuit points out, Human Collaboration Processes (HCP) are either ignored or not 
handled well by current process modeling approaches.  He argues that there is a demand 
for novel modeling tools for the design and modeling of HCPs in organizations.  Stuit 
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demonstrates an agent-based, graphical approach to modeling human interactions that 
serves as a “necessary precursor for their proper analysis and improvement” (Stuit 2011, 
3–5).  Our research addresses the modeling of human-in-the-loop decision-making 
through the artifacts of our statechart based process modeling approach.  We apply and 
enforce runtime constraints on decision-making through the use of statechart embedded 
assertions.  
C. SOFTWARE SAFETY 
Bishop provides an introduction to the concepts of information leakage and safety 
in information systems.  These terms are used rather than secure and unsecure because 
safety refers to the abstract model and security refers to the actual implementation 
(Bishop 2002, 47–91): 
Definition 3-1.  When a generic right r is added to an element of the 
access control matrix not already containing r, that right is said to be 
leaked. 
Definition 3-2.  If a system can never leak the right r, the system 
(including the initial state s0) is called safe with respect to the right r.  If 
the system can leak the right r (enter an unauthorized state), it is called 
unsafe with respect to the right r. 
The access control matrix model is fundamental to both of these concepts.  Access 
control matrices, originally proposed by Lampson were enhanced by Graham and 
Denning and are applied to modern day systems by Bishop (Lampson 1974; Denning 
1971; Graham and Denning 1972; Bishop 2002).  An access control matrix views a 
system in terms of the set of protected entities, contained in the set of objects O its active 
objects, contained in the set of subjects S; and rights drawn from the set of rights R in 
each entry a[s,o] where , , and [ , ]s S o O a s o R∈ ∈ ⊆ entity relationships are captured in a 
matrix A where rights drawn from R get assigned to each entry a[s, o].  The protection 
states of a system are then represented by the triple (S, O, A).  Within this context, 
leakage occurs when a generic right r R∈ is added to an element of the access control 
matrix not already containing r.  The set of authorized states for the system are those in 
which no command c(x1, …, xn) can leak r.   
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Safety as described here is critical for CDS.  These systems must employ access 
controls that guarantee safety in order to prevent the inadvertent transfer or disclosure of 
sensitive or classified information.  Yet, we cannot analyze a system or process in terms 
of its safety guarantees unless we precisely understand it.  Our statechart-based approach 
to formal process modeling provides the level of precision necessary to facilitate an 
analysis of the model in terms of its safety guarantees. 
D. STATECHARTS 
Harel introduced statecharts to address a well-recognized problem with regard to 
the difficulty of specifying and designing large and complex reactive systems where: 
A reactive system, in contrast with a transformational system, is 
characterized by being, to a large extent, event-driven, continuously 
having to react to external and internal stimuli.  Examples include 
telephones, automobiles, communication networks, computer operating 
systems, missile and avionics systems, and the man-machine interface of 
many kinds of ordinary software. (Harel 1987) 
His seminal work in the field of visual specifications has been studied extensively 
and utilized in wide variety of subsequent research on the application of statecharts and 
their successor, UML statecharts.   
Dong and Shensheng demonstrate that statecharts can be used to model business 
workflows by modeling an international travel agency’s process for handling customer 
travel requests.   They show that it is possible to represent hierarchal levels of the 
workflow and transition between levels by leveraging the AND/OR decomposition of 
statecharts, which provides the ability to, in effect, “zoom in” and “zoom out” of the 
model (i.e., move between abstract layers).  Additionally, they suggest that the well-
defined semantics of statecharts allow for the verification of statechart-based workflow 
models (Dong and Shensheng 2003; Harel 1987, 233–235). 
Drusinsky applied UML statecharts to real-world specification and verification in 
(Drusinsky, Shing, and Demir 2006; Drusinsky 2006; Drusinsky 2008).  Though the 
concepts and techniques introduced by Harel and Drusinsky focus on using statecharts for 
the specification and development of complex, reactive, hardware and software systems, 
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we show that these same techniques allow us to formally specify and reason about the 
largely human-based CDS Workflow process.  Drusinsky uses a Java based statechart 
notation (i.e., any Java statement can be written as a statechart action, any Java condition 
can be written as a statechart transition guard, and any Java method name can be written 
as a transition event) as a basis for describing reactive systems (Drusinsky 2006; 
Drusinsky 2011).  In other words, this Java based statechart notation is Turing equivalent.  
The notion of Turing equivalence in our chosen notation is important as this equivalence 
relationship tells us that the language described by the notation computes precisely the 
same class of functions as Turing machines.  Therefore, the deep body of research on the 
power of Turing machines applies to this Java based statechart notation.  For additional 
details, authors such as Sipser, Hopcroft, and Kelley provide a more complete discussion 
of the Turing machines and their range of computable functions (Sipser 1997; Hopcroft, 
Motwani, and Ullman 2007; Kelley 1995). 
Building on earlier work, Drusinsky and Shing extend UML statecharts to include 
K-statecharts (Drusinsky and Shing 2009).  This construct allows the use of knowledge 
logic formulae; a form of modal logic used for reasoning about multi-agent systems, for 
modeling multi-agent systems whose behavior depends on knowledge and belief 
statements made by the system agents.  Their model provides inter-visibility amongst the 
agents.  The ability of an agent to view into and act upon the behavior (i.e., states) of 
another agent allows the development of formalized, executable models for complex 
multi-agent systems. 
Crane and Dingel explore the syntactic and semantic differences between three 
different statechart formalisms: Classical, UML, and Rhapsody (Crane and Dingel 2007).  
Their results indicate a lack of standardization between these formalisms.  They show 
that due to subtle semantic and syntactic differences a model that is a well-formed 
statechart in all three of these formalisms may exhibit different behaviors in each of the 
separate formalisms.  This is not a concern for the research described in this document as 
we use only one of the formalisms, UML statecharts. 
 24 
E. REQUIREMENTS 
In the field of formal verification of systems or systems-of-systems, we ensure 
that the behavior of a subject system complies with its formal correctness specification.  
However, the formal specifications are often based on natural language (NL) 
requirements specifications.  Drusinsky points out NL specifications are often ambiguous 
and we must be careful when writing formal specifications from NL in order to ensure 
that the translation is as accurate and precise as possible.  Several ongoing research 
efforts address this problem.  Bruegge and Dutoit articulated a UML-based model for 
requirements elicitation and analysis that demonstrates the capturing of customer 
requirements, typically in natural language and subsequent translation to formal or semi-
formal notation.  The transformation to a more formal notation ensures that system 
developers work from a common understanding of the requirements provided by system 
stakeholders (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004, 123–166).  Drusinsky showed us how to identify 
NL requirements of interest from UML analysis diagrams (e.g., activity diagrams, 
message sequence diagrams) (Drusinsky 2008). 
It is important to validate formal requirements specifications to ensure they 
correctly represent the intended behavior.  In the case of requirements specifications   
written as statechart assertions, Drusinsky, Michael, Otani, and Shing introduced a 
pattern-based methodology for validating them against their NL requirements.  This is 
particularly useful when the assertions are grouped into libraries of reusable formal 
specification assertions.  The underlying concept for this approach is that statechart 
assertions are often focused on a specific, coherent concern.  This suggests a likelihood of 
ensuring they correctly represent the intended behaviors by testing them against a finite, 
representative set of validation scenarios.  The pattern-based methodology uses 
representatives groups of tests (i.e., patterns) such as obvious success, obvious failure, 
event repetition, and multiple time intervals to ensure that testing includes the type of 
scenarios often overlooked in the validation process. (Drusinsky et al. 2008; Drusinsky 
2011) 
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Our work addresses validation of requirements for human-based processes by 
facilitating the clear, visually appealing articulation of requirements in the same notation 
used to model a process under examination.  When articulated in this manner, post-facto 
analysis and modification of these requirements may be performed in a rigorous and 
well-structured manner.  Our work addresses the requirements verification concern for 
software engineering related human-based processes by ensuring process adherence to 
requirements articulated in statechart assertions and embedded within our statechart-
based process models. 
F. RESEARCH GAPS 
This research identified gaps in the wide body of research on process engineering 
and process validation and verification.  A significant body of research exists on the 
development of executable software development and business process models from 
formal specifications.  However, a gap exists with regard to conducting runtime 
verification of the executable process models.  Our work addresses this need by providing 
a formal process modeling approach with runtime verification of the executable process 
model via embedded statechart assertions.  We achieve this by treating human-based 
processes, conceptually, as reactive systems and applying to them formalized tools and 
techniques. 
We examined research that articulates the challenges of taking a model developed 
in a language lacking a formal semantic and translating that model to a sufficiently 
formal language to allow verification.  Our modeling approach addresses this gap by 
allowing the process engineer to both design and verify process models within the same 
formal specification language. 
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III. THE MODELING APPROACH 
In this Chapter, we describe the approach by which we apply formal methods 
tools and techniques to the modeling of partially automated, human-based, C&A 
processes. 
A. FORMAL METHODS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
1. Desirable Attributes of Formal Methods to Support the Modeling Ap-
proach 
Analysis of the research discussed in Chapter II revealed knowledge gaps in the 
field of applying formal methods to high-level processes.  We developed a set of 
desirable attributes for a formal specification language and associate tools to support the 
modeling of high-level, human-based processes and address the identified knowledge 
gaps. 
The language should have a well-defined syntax and semantics in order to provide 
the level of formality necessary to unambiguously model and facilitate V&V of the 
process.  The visual representation of the language should be sufficiently understandable 
as to provide a good communication medium between users, stakeholders, and process 
engineers.  The language needs to provide mechanisms or artifacts that allow the formal 
specification of human-in-the-loop decision-making.  The language needs to be able to 
represent attributes such as hierarchy and concurrency that are often found in complex 
human-based processes.  The formal specification of the model as well as the artifacts 
necessary for verification of the model should all be expressible in the same language.  
Table 2 shows a comparison chart for the languages. 
The language’s associated tools should provide a mechanism for building a visual 
representation of the models using the chosen language.  The modeling tools should 
provide the flexibility to make adjustments to the process model as necessary.  They 
should also be able to generate an executable representation of the model.  The associated 
tools should provide the ability to conduct runtime verification of the modeled process, 
an automated means of verifying an executing model’s adherence to specified properties 
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or requirements.  This would require a means of monitoring the process model in 
execution and enforcing desirable runtime properties of the executing process model, 
such as ensuring adherence to temporal constraints. 
We hypothesize that a formal language and associated tools that have, at a 
minimum, the listed attributes will enable the formal specification, maintenance, 
validation, and runtime verification of a model that accurately represents a partially 
automated, human-based, C&A process and provide a viable communication medium for 
discussing the process among users, stakeholders, and process engineers. 
2. Assessment of Formal Methods for Desirable Attributes 
We assessed several formal languages and their associated tools, such as 
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) (Hoare 1985), Petri nets (Emmerich and 
Gruhn 1991), the Z formal language, and UML statecharts (Drusinsky 2006) to determine 
whether they possessed the attributes listed in Section III.A.1.  These languages are 
compared in Table 2 on the basis of how closely each on matches our set of desirable 
attributes. 
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Table 2. Desirable Attributes of a Formal Language for Process Modeling Approach 
 Language 



















Well-defined syntax/semantics     
Easily understandable (visual)     
Specify human decision-making     
Represent nesting     
Represent hierarchy     
Represent concurrent activities     
Model/verify in same language     
 
Ryan and Schneider used CSP as a modeling mechanism for a variety of security 
protocols (Ryan and Schneider 2000).  Wong and Gibbons demonstrated a technique for 
representing BPMN process models in CSP in order to provide a semantics for formal 
analysis and comparison of BPMN diagrams (Wong and Gibbons 2008).  As discussed in 
Chapter II of this document, CSP is based on a relatively complex mathematical notation.  
Many researchers in the field of process modeling have discussed the importance of 
reducing the complexity and increasing the ease of understanding formal process models 




(Emmerich et al. 1996; Koehler, Tirenni, and Kumaran 2002; Zongyan, Liyang, and 
Hongli 2010; Hurtado Alegría, Bastarrica, and Bergel 2010; Hurtado Alegría, Bastarrica, 
and Bergel 2011; Karniel and Reich). 
Many researchers have applied Petri nets to high-level processes as a means of 
formal specification.  The works of Emmerich and Gruhn (1991); Gruhn (1992); Van Der 
Aalst and Van Hee (2004); and Van Dongen, Van Der Aalst, and Verbeek (2005) 
demonstrate a variety of methods of applying Petri nets as a tool for process modeling.  
The graphical nature of Petri nets makes them an excellent tool for communicating about 
a process under examination.  However, researchers have pointed out that Petri nets do 
not scale well for the visual representation of large, complex processes as the basic Petri 
net formalism lacks artifacts for representation of hierarchy.  Clempner proposed an 
extension to represent hierarchy in a subclass of Petri nets known as Decision Process 
Petri Nets (DPPNS) though his work is formative in nature (Clempner 2010). 
Hibdon and Hartrum built an executable model of a U.S. Air Force component 
known as a wing.  Their modeling process required creation of an informal Rumbaugh 
object model (Rumbaugh et al. 1991), translation to the formal language Z, and 
subsequent translation into Refine constructs for execution (Hibdon and Hartrum 1996).  
The final product of their multi-step approach was an executable model; however, the Z 
language and the Refine construct are both complex, non-visual representational 
formalisms. 
UML statecharts are a visual formalism that has been used for representation and 
formal specification of systems, architectures, and processes.  As discussed in Chapter II 
of this document, researchers have demonstrated that UML statecharts have well-defined 
semantics with artifacts expressive enough to capture elements of human-in-the-loop 
decision-making.  They have been demonstrated as an effective visual communication 
mechanism for communicating about processes (Dong and Shensheng 2003).  
Specifications written as statechart assertions and embedded within a statechart-based 
process model enable runtime verification of the model.  UML Statechart assertions are a 
class of statecharts and as such, written in the same language.   
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UML statecharts possess the desired attributes for a formal specification language 
that we outlined in Section III.A.1.  This formal language was the best fit in terms of its 
potential for use in addressing the research gaps identified in Chapter II.   
After deciding on a language that satisfies the stated desired attributes, we needed 
to determine if any of the currently available tools for working with UML statecharts 
would satisfy the requirements stated in Section III.A.1.  Both research based and 
commercially based tools exist for the design and manipulation and statechart-based 
models.  We look at several of these tools such as VisualSTATE, Yakindu, and 
StateRover (IAR Systems 2012; Muelder 2011; Drusinsky 2006). 
VisualSTATE is standalone statechart-based modeling tool that also provides a 
point-and-click interface for easy development and editing of models.  This software has 
a built-in module for code-generation to automatically create an executable representation 
of the model in C++.  The software automatically performs syntactic verification to 
ensure model compliance with the underlying language rules.  The verification module 
includes the functionality for static analysis of the model to ensure compliance with both 
pre-defined and custom properties.  VisualSTATE has a dynamic analyses module that 
can provide an animated view of how specific events affect a model.  Events are fed into 
the simulation via an interface with the ability to replay sequences of logged events.  
However, VisualSTATE does not include the functionality to enforce requirements in 
conjunction with runtime execution monitoring. 
Yakindu is a statechart-based modeling tool that operates as a plug-in for the 
Eclipse integrated development environment (IDE).  Yakindu is a visual modeling tool 
that does provide a mechanism for automated generation of an executable model.  It has a 
point-and-click interface that makes it easy to build and dynamically adjust models.  The 
Yakindu plug-in has the capability to interface with an external code-generator module 
capable of mapping a statechart model to C or Java source code.  However, the code 
generator module is experimental and must be installed separately from the Yakindu 
plug-in.  The plug-in applies automatic syntactic verification rules to each statechart  
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model and reports discrepancies to the model developer via both visual and textual 
cueing.  Yakindu provides a simulation function that executes the generated code but it 
does not provide the ability to conduct runtime verification. 
StateRover is a UML statechart-based modeling plug-in for the Eclipse IDE.  This 
tool includes a built-in code generation module that automatically maps a statechart 
model to C, C++, or Java source code.  Model design is accomplished through a point-
and-click interface that makes it easy to build and dynamically adjust or reuse models.  
The tool includes an automated syntactic and semantic validation module to ensure model 
compliance with the underlying statechart syntax rules and semantics.  In addition, code 
generation will not run unless the model is able to successfully pass the syntactic and 
semantic validation with no errors.  StateRover provides the functionality for runtime 
verification of a statechart model through the application of embedded statechart 
assertions enforced within the model during execution.  StateRover provides an 
integrated, white-box3 test generator that builds test cases for use in automated testing.  
The generated test cases are used in within the JUnit4 test framework to provide runtime 
execution monitoring of the model as it enacts the generated test cases.  Embedded 
statechart assertions serve to enforce runtime properties or constraints placed on the 
model (e.g., temporal constraints). 
Of the statechart modeling tools surveyed, StateRover possesses the desired 
attributes outlined in Section III.A.1 for a tool designed to enable modeling in our chosen 
formal language.  This tool was a best-fit in terms of its potential for use in addressing the 
research gaps identified in Chapter II. 
B. PROCEDURE 
The diagram shown in Figure 6 outlines our process modeling approach.  Solid 
lines represent the primary procedural flow path.  Dashed lines represent ongoing 
communication with process stakeholders to ensure a modeled process aligns with and 
                                                 
3 The white-box test generator is discussed in Section III.C.6. 
4 The JUnit test framework is discussed in Section III.D.3. 
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achieves their desired outcomes as originally specified in stakeholder requirements.  This 
ongoing feedback loop is one component of model validation. 
Our approach provides the level of formalism necessary to rigorously specify a 
partially automated, human-based, C&A process and conduct runtime verification on that 
process to ensure the process behaves exactly as it was designed.  This allows the process 
engineers and stakeholders to ensure that the process flows exactly as it is intended.  
Formalization will significantly improve the final product of a process for developing, 
implementing, and C&A of cross domain solutions designed to facilitate and guard the 
flow of information between various security domains.  Formalizing the process will help 
ensure that it provides a product that is well-defined, well-developed, and consistent in its 
execution. 
 
Figure 6. Overview of Statechart-Based Process Modeling Approach 
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1. Iterative Design 
Our modeling approach allows the process engineer to iteratively create a process 
model in conjunction with creation of the process itself.  Once the process is established, 
the process engineer can use this approach to adjust the model throughout the lifecycle of 
the underlying process. 
Berry and Wing tell us that a second look at the thing being formalized can result 
in a better product, since for any large or highly complex project, one must understand 
the problem – a lack of understanding can lead to catastrophic failures.  They go on to 
suggest that such an understanding is more likely to be achieved when building a 
“complete” model of the intended system (e.g., a formal specification or a prototype) 
(Berry and Wing 1985).  Our approach facilitates such an understanding of the modeled 
process through construction of the UML statechart-based process model.  For example, 
Figure 7 is a process outline of the CDIP provided by the UCDMO while Figure 8 shows 
the statechart-based model developed through our modeling approach applied to the 
CDIP. 
 
Figure 7. Cross Domain Implementation Process (CDIP) 
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The outline of Figure 7 is informal in the sense that it pictorially describes a 
process, yet it has none of the elements necessary to be considered a formal specification.  
We consider a specification to be formal when it is written with mathematically based 
techniques as the foundation for the specification language.  Gabbar says, “A 
specification language is based on a set of formulae, written in a formal language, to 
describe the underlying system” (Gabbar 2006).  In the case of our modeling approach it 
describes the underlying human-based process.  
 
Figure 8. StateRover Model of CDIP 
Figure 8 shows a large-scale view of a formal model of the CDIP.  We developed 
this model using our statechart-based formal modeling approach in conjunction with the 
StateRover modeling tool.  The CDIP formal model provides us with an unambiguous 
view of the process under examination.  The process of building the UML statechart-
based model serves as the “very important” second look described by Berry and Wing 
(Berry and Wing 1985). 
2. Terminology 
We use the terms thread, transition, decision-point, process requirements, timing, 
complexity, layering, and scenario in a particular way and provide definitions below to 
ensure readers develop a common understanding of our lexicon for development of a 
statechart-based process model.   
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a. Threads 
In our approach to formal process modeling, we use statechart threads (the 
blue dashed-line boxes of Figure 9) to represent orthogonality within states.  
Conceptually, orthogonality resembles concurrency though it is different in that the 
activities captured in different threads are, for the most part, independent of, or 
orthogonal to each other; whereas concurrent activities occur in relation and typically at 
the same time as one another and due to the interrelationship can involve interference, 
synchronization, locking, and recovery.  Throughout this document, we use the term 
thread to refer to statechart threads vice OS-level or programming language related 
threads.  The latter threads are typically used as the computer programming 
implementation of concurrency while the former provides a means for notating the 
existence of orthogonality within a process. 
 
Figure 9. Example of Threads in "Op_Monitor" Sub-Process 
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b. Transitions 
A process has as its atomic operation what we call “steps.”  There can be 
sub-processes as well.  Sub-processes represent sets of steps grouped together on the 
basis of cohesion and coherence.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines these terms as: 
cohesion, “the action or condition of cohering; cleaving or sticking together” and 
coherence, “consistency in reasoning, or relating, so that one part of the discourse does 
not destroy or contradict the rest” (Oxford English Dictionary 2012a).  Within a process 
there can be transitions between steps, as well as between sub-processes.  In our 
modeling approach, transitions between sub-processes are modeled using an artifact 
called “off-page references.”  We see a transition from processing a CDS request to 
implementing the CDS in Figure 10.  CD_Officer_Validator is a thread contained within 
the Process sub-process of the CDS model.  In this case, we observe a transition from the 
sub-process named Process to the sub-process named Arbitrate via the off-page reference 
RefToArbitrate1 (outlined in red). 
 
Figure 10. Transition Using an “Off-Page Reference” Artifact 
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c. Decision Points 
We are interested in modeling processes that have a strong flavor of the 
human playing a significant role in the enactment of the process.  The process itself can 
have varying levels of automation, and the level of automation may vary by modality and 
circumstance.  For instance, on a ship, the process of target acquisition and firing may be 
highly automated under nominal operating conditions, but weapon systems (e.g., 5”/54 
series guns) may be operated manually in highly degraded operations.  In the context of 
human-based processes, we refer to decision points as those places where a decision must 
be made (e.g., yes or no, approve or disapprove) and that decision’s outcome falls within 
an expected range of values.  In other words, during process analysis, we seek out the 
decision points and articulate them in the model as conditional- or value-based transitions 
between components of the model.   
 
Figure 11. Decision Point Example 
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The diamond in Figure 11, labeled bIntApprovConn (outlined in red), 
demonstrates the StateRover artifact view of a decision point in our process model.  We 
found a significant number of decision points when analyzing and modeling our 
demonstrative exemplar processes.  Therefore, we recommend using a table to manage 
the associated variables and ensure all decision points are implemented in the model as 
demonstrated in Table 3.  In column 1 we use a plain language description of the 
decision, in column 2 we list the variable name that will be used in StateRover’s visual 
switch construct, in column 3 we list the possible outcomes of the decision point (i.e., the 
possible values of the variable), and in column 4 we track whether the decision point has 
been incorporated into the process model. 
Table 3. Example Decision Point Tracking 









Determine whether capability exists as 




d. Process Requirements 
Process requirements are those properties, attributes, or timing constraints 
that must be upheld as the process executes.  For example, if a process requires that some 
event occur at a set time, our process modeling approach provides runtime process 
monitoring to ensure that the event occurs within a specified temporal constraint.  A 
(formal) specification is a representation of a requirement that uses notation a computer 
can understand and read in a finite amount of time using finite resources (Drusinsky 
2006).  Our modeling approach uses a UML statechart-based language to build 
specifications.  We use this formal specification language to create embedded statechart 
assertions, which serve to enforce process requirements at runtime. 
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e. Timing 
Timing refers to quantifiable time constraints or restraints (e.g., the time at 
which something must occur or the time within with something must occur).  In human-
based processes, we expect to find many temporal restraints such as deadlines for 
submitting paperwork.  Therefore, it is important for a process modeling approach 
intended to formalize human-based processes that we are able to capture and effectively 
address timing related information.  In order to build timing into our models, we leverage 
temporal constructs inherent in our chosen modeling software.  For example, the 
statechart assertion of Figure 12 uses the TRTimeoutSimulatedTime construct of 
StateRover to apply a temporal constraint to the modeled process.  We do this by 
embedding the statechart assertion of Figure 12 into the CDS process model.  Embedded 
statechart assertions are the primary vehicle for building and applying temporal 
constraints and restraints to a process modeled with our approach. 
 
Figure 12. Applying Temporal Constraints and Restraints 
f. Complexity 
Several researchers have examined the notion of complexity as it relates to 
processes and have presented metrics to provide information about the understandability 
and maintainability of business process models (Volker Gruhn and Laue 2006; Cardoso 
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2007; Cardoso et al. 2006).  Cardoso presented the control-flow complexity (CFC) metric 
for determining the complexity of business processes.  This metric is expressed as a 
summation of joins and splits (AND, OR, or XOR) in a process.  In general, the more 
splits and joins a process has, the more complex it is (i.e., it is more difficult to develop 
and maintain complex process models).  However, as Cardoso points out, the CFC metric 
is somewhat simplistic and does not account for the increased complexity introduced by 
nested structures (Cardoso et al. 2006).  We adopt Cardoso’s definition of process 
complexity and note that when applied to the type of partially automated, human-based, 
C&A processes that we are interested in, as the number splits or joins and nested layers 
increases, so does the complexity of the process.   
g. Layering 
Layering refers to the ability to individually articulate nested levels within 
a process model.  This is a particularly useful technique when analyzing and building 
models of highly complex processes.  For instance; in our exemplar process, the CDS, we 
wish to capture various views of the model.  This approach allows us to view the model 
at varying levels of complexity, depending on the desired outcome of the viewing.  For 
instance, the top-level view of Figure 13 provides an overview of the process model with 
each of the major phases depicted as a single state. 
 
Figure 13. Top-level Statechart Model of CDS Workflow Process 
 42 
This view provides a large-scale aspect on the process vice details of the 
inner workings of each process.  In the second level view, we can examine each sub-
process individually as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15.  The initiate sub-process is 
articulated in Figure 14 while the Op/Monitor is articulated in Figure 15.   
 
Figure 14. Sub-process Titled “Initiate_CDSR” 
These sub-processes sit at the second level of the hierarchy for the 
purposes of our analysis and each represents a fuller view of its respective sub-process, 
each of which is represented by a single state at the top-level of the process model.  Part 
of dealing with complexity is the ability to work in the abstract, and then incrementally 
decompose the process into successively finer levels of detail (i.e., processes, sub-
processes, and so on). 
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Figure 15. Sub-process Titled “Op/Monitor” 
The diagrams shown in Figure 16 demonstrate the successive 
decomposition of four levels of hierarchy.  When viewed together, we see that the ability 




Figure 16. Decomposing a Complex Hierarchical Process Model 
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h. Scenario 
In the context of our modeling approach, the term scenario refers to a 
combined collection of desired properties, timings, human decisions, and/or conditions 
that we wish to apply vis-à-vis a process model in order to exercise or stimulate various 
aspects or behaviors of the model.  We use this term to describe situations for which we 
will develop tests during the “V&V Process Model” step of our modeling approach. 
C. MODELING APPROACH 
In this section we will discuss the details of each step of our process modeling 
approach shown in Figure 6. 
1. Process Selection 
Process selection is a non-trivial matter.  Informal processes or well-defined 
processes whose outcome is not safety or security critical may not require the level of 
formality afforded by our approach.  The application of our statechart-based modeling 
approach requires a time investment to analyze the process and apply formal methods.  
However, it is a worthwhile investment for the types of processes that we are interested in 
formally specifying and reasoning about since the modeled process will be easier to 
understand and communicate about and the resulting process modeling will be easy to 
develop, debug, and maintain. 
2. Process Analysis 
Prior to constructing the process model in StateRover, it is helpful to analyze the 
process.  During this phase of our modeling approach, we are identifying components of 
the process that lend themselves to articulation as artifacts in a statechart-based formal 
model.  This is also where we identify specific requirements or specifications which we 
wish the model to adhere to.  This eases the process of building and verifying the model.  
It also facilitates the development of a more robust, granular, and higher fidelity model.  
Process analysis facilitates a more full-bodied statechart-based process model via the 
thorough a priori inspection of the process during model development.  Similarly, 
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process analysis provides the process engineer an opportunity to identify many if not all 
of the process components and timing considerations with a focus on the behavioral 
properties of the model vice run of the mill functional properties and requirements.  
Hence, we are able to develop a more granular and higher fidelity model. 
Process formalization requires thorough analysis of the chosen process as a key 
component of developing the formal model in StateRover.  Through analysis, we develop 
a better understanding of the process under examination and begin to formulate a plan for 
contextualizing individual components vis-à-vis our modeling approach with its 
associated views and terminology.  We must understand threads, transitions, decision 
points, process requirements, timing, complexity, layering, and important steps in the 
process. 
The process engineer uses a combination of available sources such as informal 
drawings, interviews with stakeholders, mission statements, modeling diagrams (e.g., 
UML activity diagrams, YAWL workflow charts), or basic flowcharts.  The focus of this 
phase of our modeling approach is to develop as complete an understanding of the 
process as possible.  One of the challenges of process analysis is that the stakeholders 
and/or process owners’ understanding and documentation of the process could range 
from tribal knowledge held by one or a few individuals to more formalized 
documentation such as written flowcharts or models based on notations like BPMN or 
UML. 
During this phase of the modeling approach the process engineer also gathers 
requirements from process stakeholders.  These will provide the source material for 
developing embedded statechart assertions, a key element to enable runtime execution 
monitoring of the process model. 
We show in Chapter IV of this document how the analysis of a process leads to a 
fully realized statechart-based formal model of the process. 
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3. Construct Process Model 
It is during this step of the modeling approach that the process engineer builds the 
statechart-based process model.  Leveraging the products of the “Process Analysis” step 
he visually articulates the process using the formal language and tools chosen for their 
adherence to the desirable attributes listed in Section III.A.1. 
We previously demonstrated the novel use of UML statecharts as a medium and 
the StateRover modeling tool as a mechanism for formally modeling the CDIP, a partially 
automated, human-based, C&A process (Schumann 2009).  In this document, we 
demonstrate the use of UML statecharts as a fundamental component of the process 
modeling approach shown in Figure 6. 
Since our chosen modeling tool generates an executable model in Java we are 
able to add Java code to just about any component of the model such as states, transitions, 
or flowchart boxes.  In our discussion of case studies, we will show how this 
functionality helps us ensure that embedded assertions are enforced at runtime.     
 
Figure 17. Top-level Statechart Model of CDS Workflow Process 
UML statecharts provide a visually palatable vehicle for the articulation of, 
formalization of, and communication about a process model such as the one shown in 
Figure 17, a process model for our demonstrative exemplar, the CDS Workflow process.  
In addition, we are able to take full advantage of automated statechart-handling 
 48 
capabilities built into StateRover such as hierarchy, concurrency, non-determinism, 
syntactic validation, workflow modeling, automated testing, and runtime monitoring. 
a. Iterative Validation 
During the design process, the process engineer is able to use the 
immediate feedback from StateRover’s underlying rule checking mechanisms to identify 
possible errors within the process model.  The process engineer can use the errors 
identified via this mechanism to diagnose, troubleshoot, and correct inconsistencies in the 
process model.  This systematic approach helps ensure that the model is founded on and 
adheres to the underlying UML statechart formalisms. 
 
Figure 18. StateRover Automated Validation 
Figure 18 demonstrates the embedded error identification within the StateRover 
plug-in.  For this example, we deliberately placed a unitary terminal state, circled in red, 
in the CDS Workflow process model’s top level.  Since this terminal state does not have 
a corresponding start state, it constitutes an error and is identified as such via 
StateRover’s embedded validation mechanism.  We refer to this as iterative validation 
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and use it throughout construction of the process model and the statechart assertions to 
ensure they adhere to the underlying UML statechart semantics. 
4. Construct Statechart Assertions 
In this step, the process engineer transforms the requirements developed during 
“Process Analysis” into statechart assertions.  The UML statechart articulation of each 
requirement is in the same statechart-based language as the rest of the model.  This 
provides a precise way of stating requirements that directly takes advantage of the 
formalisms used to develop the process model.  During the execution phase of our 
approach, embedded statechart assertions are employed as enforceable runtime 
specifications. 
Embedded statechart assertions are a key addition of this research to the process 
modeling world.  They facilitate runtime execution monitoring as well as enforcement of 
desirable properties or requirements placed on the process (i.e., submission timeline for a 
request necessary for process progression).  Within this section, we cover the conceptual 
foundations of statechart assertions.  We explore their benefits as applied to process 
engineering and modeling.  We investigate their employment to achieve runtime 
monitoring of a human-based process in execution. 
a. Statechart Assertions 
A reason for using a formal methods based modeling approach is to 
demonstrate mathematically that the model adheres to a set of stated requirements.  A 
number of formal notations exist for the specification of formal models.  Some examples 
include the Z Notation, Vienna Development Method (VDM), and the B Method (Monin 
and Hinchey 2003).  Each formal notation can be distinguished by its particular 
application of set-theoretic mathematical concepts, the underlying logic, or how they 
assist in the development of computer programs, which is the typical use for such 




extending UML statechart diagrams to include statechart assertions, which provide a 
formal artifact for the specification of requirements (i.e., a formalized specification 
language). 
Statechart assertions have two fundamental differences from the 
statecharts used throughout the rest of our modeling process.  1) They have a built-in 
mechanism for indicating Boolean success or failure (true/false), which makes them 
suitable for formal specification and 2) they can be nondeterministic if desired.  Figure 19 
Figure 19 shows a statechart assertion. 
Drusinsky points out that it is important to exercise meticulous care in the 
development of statechart assertions as bad assertions reflect poorly conceived 
requirements and are unlikely to help ensure the system behaves as desired (Drusinsky, 
Shing, and Demir 2007).  Additional papers by Drusinsky, et al. provide more examples 
of the development and application of embedded statechart assertions (Drusinsky 2008; 
Drusinsky, Shing, and Demir 2006). 
 
Figure 19. Example of an Statechart Assertion 
Sindre and Opdahl postulate that a visually appealing approach may 
actually be more successful than a textual approach when capturing requirements.  This is 
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because simple and intuitive diagrams provide a better overview of the functionality of a 
system and make it easier to see each stakeholder’s interest in the system which makes it 
easier to communicate about the captured requirements (Sindre and Opdahl 2000).  The 
combination of UML statecharts and embedded statechart assertions provides us with a 
visually appealing formal process modeling approach wherein the model and the 
assertions that enforce properties of the model are written in the same language, in this 
case UML statecharts.  This addresses one of the challenges seen in previous formal 
process modeling research; the integration of a separate formal specification language in 
order to add formalisms to the process modeling approach (Emmerich and Gruhn 1991).  
Additionally, process models will be easier to develop, debug, and maintain due to the 
ability for users, stakeholders, and process engineers to easily communicate about the 
modeled process. 
b. Validating Statechart Assertions 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an oracle is, “an opinion or 
declaration regarded as authoritative and infallible” (Oxford English Dictionary 2012b). 
Since both our process model and the statechart assertions that represent requirements on 
the model are derived from natural language descriptions, it cannot be assumed that one 
is more of an oracle than the other.  However, the properties upon which we base 
statechart assertions are typically small enough that they don’t require more than five to 
ten validation tests.  This suggests that we can use a relatively small number of tests to 
build a body of evidence for using the assertions as an oracle for testing the behaviors of 
a process model.  A pattern-based methodology like the one described by Drusinsky, 
Michael, Otani, and Shing can help ensure that we cover often overlooked testing areas 
when writing validation tests for our assertions (Drusinsky et al. 2008; Drusinsky 2011).  
They describe scenario test patterns such as obvious success, obvious failure, full 
scenario success, full scenario failure. 
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Figure 20. Timeline Diagram for “obvious success” Assertion Test Scenario 
The diagram of Figure 20 shows a test scenario to ensure that the assertion 
of Figure 19 succeeds when it is supposed to for a simple set of conditions (i.e., obvious 
success test pattern).  Once the assertion has entered state Timer it must see a 
Requirements_Valid() event with 100 time units or the assertion fails.  The event 
Requirements_Valid() occurs at time 90 and no further events or transitions occur so we 
expect this assertion succeed during testing. 
 
Figure 21. Timeline Diagram for “obvious failure” Assertion Test Scenario 
In contrast Figure 21 shows a test scenario to ensure that the assertion of 
Figure 19 fails when it should for a simple set of conditions (i.e., obvious failure test 
pattern).  In this case, the timer advances past 100 prior to a Requirements_Valid() event 
so a timeout will fire and cause the assertion to fail. 
5. Embed Assertions in Process Model 
During this step of the modeling approach, representative artifacts for each 
statechart assertion are embedded in the process model.  Figure 22 demonstrates the use 
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of an embedded assertion in the CDS Workflow formal process model.  In the “Initiate 
CDS Request” phase of the CDS Workflow we use an embedded assertion, _assert1 (see 
Figure 22, outlined in red), to ensure that the human decision makers initiating a CDS 
request have set impact levels for the requested CDS.  Impact levels provide a means of 
categorizing national security systems in terms of the potential impact of unauthorized 
disclosure of the information residing on the system and must be explicitly stated as part 
of a CDS request.   
We previously examined testing of statechart-based formal process models and 
showed that embedded assertions could be applied to formal models of human-based 
processes (Schumann and Michael 2009) as a means of enforcing requirements. When 
testing the model, failures to adhere to the requirements of the assertion are recorded and 
reported by the testing module. This ensures that the model behaves as expected under a 
wide variety of conditions while the executable version of the model is running.  This 
technique allows us to use embedded assertions as an enforcement tool for process 
requirements because the embedded assertions are located within the model (see Figure 
22), which provides unique access to the process model’s events, variables, and timing 
structures as it executes.  This positioning is the enabler that allows embedded statechart 
assertions to act in an enforcement role. 
The _assert1 box of Figure 22 is an example of the method by which an statechart 
assertion is embedded within a process model.  The _assert1 box acts as a placeholder 
and insertion point for the statechart assertion of Figure 19 which shows the statechart 
assertion for ensuring that meets temporal requirements.  The natural language version of 
this requirement is: 
“R1: A review of the CDS request must be completed within 100 time units of the 
time review begins.” 
If this assertion detects a setLevelsNull system event, bSuccess is set to false 
whereas a setLevels system event prints a message to the runtime monitor console and 
the statechart assertion remains in the Start state.  This provides one example of the type 
of response mechanism available upon detection of a system event.  The bSuccess 
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Boolean variable allows the process engineer to validate whether the conditions of the 
assertion have been met or not.  Verification occurs through an interlacing of the process 
model and the JUnit Test framework to apply a variety of automatically and manually 
generated testing scenarios. 
 
Figure 22. Statechart Assertion Scoped by Substatechart Requestor_Initiate 
An added advantage of embedded statechart assertions is that they are naturally 
scoped by the context of their substatechart (Drusinsky 2006).  Therefore, they are only 
active when their substatechart is entered and they cease to be active when the process 
transitions out of the containing substatechart.  This property of embedded statechart 
assertions lends itself to hierarchy and scalability in the process modeling approach.  This 
property also allows the process engineer to better deal with process complexity by 
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providing the ability to enforce process requirements in runtime at a variety of levels and 
with varying scope.  This also facilitates easier development, debugging, and 
maintenance as the process engineer can quickly ascertain the scope of each embedded 
statechart assertion. 
6. V&V Process Model 
During this step of the modeling approach, we validate and verify the process 
model.  In order to discuss the notion of validating and verifying a process model we 
must first define the terms validation and verification.  Our research applies the terms as 
defined by Drusinsky, Michael, and Shing (Drusinsky, Michael, and Shing 2007).  
Validation is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built, that is, the product fulfills 
its specific intended purpose.  Simply stated, validation asks the question, “Did we build 
the right product?”  Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is built correctly, 
in the sense that the output products of an activity meet the specifications imposed on 
them in previous activities.  Simply stated, verification asks the question, “Did we build 
the product right?”  We leverage the components and capabilities of our chosen formal 
modeling tool to validate and verify statechart-based process models.  
We employ two types of verification in the modeling approach, manual testing 
and runtime execution monitoring.  Each of these uses test cases which are an important 
construct for verifying that the executable version of a process model operates as 
intended.  Test cases are created in one of two ways.  They may be manually generated 
by the process engineer or automatically generated via the StateRover code generation 
module and these two types of test cases are used in the “Manual Testing” and “Runtime 
Execution Monitoring (Automated testing)” steps of our modeling approach, 
respectively.  Both automatically and manually generated test cases represent encoded 
version of testing scenarios.  For the type of partially automated, human-based, C&A 
processes that we are interested in modeling, test cases equate to sequences of real-world 
process related events, conditions, timing, and human decisions.  They allow us to 
examine the response or flow of a process model in a simulated test environment. 
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a. Validation  
Our modeling approach uses three types of validation.  1) Automated 
syntactic validation via algorithms built into our chosen modeling tool which we 
discussed in Section III.C.3.a.  2) Validation of statechart assertions to ensure they 
accurately represent stakeholder requirements 3) Validation against stakeholder 
expectations which requires process engineers to compare the model to requirements 
derived during the “Process Analysis” phase of our approach and to maintain a review 
and feedback loop with process stakeholders.  The intent of validation is to ensure the 
process model remains synchronized with stakeholder expectations throughout the design 
process.  In the Figure 6 overview of our modeling approach, this type of validation is 
represented by dashed lines showing the feedback loop from process model to 
stakeholders. 
b. Verification – Manual Testing 
The process engineer uses manually generated test cases for multiple 
purposes.  During the “Construct Process Model” and “Construct Statechart assertions” 
steps of process model development, he writes manual tests to iteratively ensure 
components of the model behave as expected.  He also uses manual tests to ensure the 
model, as a whole, accurately reflects the process being modeled and that the process 
produces expected results for specific scenarios.  He also builds tests to examine one or 
more portions of the process during development, debugging, or maintenance.  Figure 23 
shows a manually generated test case that represents a testing scenario for the CDIP. 
 57 
 
Figure 23. Manually Generated Test Case Used in CDIP Verification 
This test case executes a scenario to test flow through the model to ensure 
that specific events and variable settings will cause the model to behave in the way we 
expect.  In this case, we wish to see movement through the entire model via a particular 
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path and termination of model execution if a SystNotSecure() event is detected during the 
operation and monitoring phase of a CDS’ lifecycle. 
c. Verification – Runtime Execution Monitoring 
During the manual testing phase, the process engineer works at a micro 
scale, setting variables and events to an executing process model via handwritten test 
cases.  In contrast, during automated testing he works at the macro scale, adjusting test 
parameters such as number of tests, test length, number of permissible loops or choosing 
between stochastic and deterministic testing algorithms while a white-box test generator 
(WTG) automatically adjusts the micro scale elements at runtime.  He is able to use the 
information from testing to better understand, debug, maintain, and communicate about a 
process model.  The executable version of a process model provides a vehicle for runtime 
execution monitoring.  The medium within which this vehicle operates is the JUnit test 
framework.  By leveraging the JUnit test framework we are able to apply at runtime 
automatically or manually generated test cases against the executable representation of 
our model.  Automatically generated test cases facilitate exploration of all possible 
execution paths available to the executable model and exploration of the effect of 
numerous input sequences on the process model. 
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Figure 24. White-box Test Generator Code Snippet 
StateRover employs an embedded WTG, which is automatically created 
by the code generation model.  The WTG of the CDIP process model is shown in Figure 
24.  This provides the flexibility to generalize and scale the WTG to a wide variety of 
processes.  The WTG is specific to each SUT and is built during automated code 
generation of the executable version of the process model. 
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Table 4. Runtime Execution Monitoring Data Collection  
 Test Run # 
Description of Attributes 
1 2 3 4 
Number of tests per run 5 25 50 100 
Failed assertions     
All states visited     
Time to complete test run 77.5s 398.2s 853.9s 1523.6s 
We use the feedback from testing to help assess and compare things such 
as number of tests per test run, whether assertions failed in a test run, whether or not all 
states were visited during testing, and time to complete each test run.  These factors can 
be tabulated and compared via a table format as shown in Table 4.  A process engineer 
should collect and compare the data necessary to understand, debug, and maintain the 
process model.  In our case, we show Table 4 as an example of the type of data we found 
useful while developing our case studies. 
D. STATEROVER MODELING TOOL 
In this section we provide an overview of how the StateRover modeling tool, in 
conjunction with the JUnit testing framework, can be used to carry out our modeling 
procedure and list some of the technical details and considerations when using the tool.  
As detailed in Section III.A.1, StateRover was chosen because it most closely matched 
the set of desirable attributes for a tool that would facilitate the development of process 
models in our chosen formal language. 
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1. Adding .Jar Files 
When setting up the StateRover for process model development, several key .jar 
files must be added to the Java Build Path found in the project properties as shown in 
Figure 25, circled in red.  Stateroverifacesrc.jar and TReclipseAnimation.jar are included 
with the StateRover plugin and are required for code generation and animation of process 
models created with StateRover.  The files derby.jar, derbynet.jar, and derbyclient.jar are 
required to enable StateRover’s data collection and reporting capabilities via an 
embedded or external data collection facility.  The process engineer uses the “Add 
external JARs” command of the Java Build Path window to add these .jar files as a 
component of the project.  This step needs to be taken for each StateRover project. 
 
Figure 25. Adding Necessary .jar Files to Java Build Path 
2. Setting up the White-box Test Generator 
In order to facilitate white box testing, the process engineer is able to adjust the 
parameters of the white-box test generator (WTG) embedded in StateRover.  These 
parameters are adjusted via the “statechart.properties” file created automatically for each 
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new statechart diagram.  For example, in Figure 26 the “CDIP” statechart properties 
filename is circled in red with its associated WTG properties circled in blue. 
 
Figure 26. Statechart Properties and WTG Parameters 
The “White Box Tester” properties view shown in Figure 26 demonstrates some 
of the adjustable parameters.  In many cases, the default properties applied at code 
generation time are sufficient.  For more advanced or complex process modeling, the 
process engineer has the flexibility to adjust parameters via this mechanism. 
3. JUnit Testing Framework 
JUnit is well suited to the enable automated verification of partially automated, 
human-based, C&A processes.  Conceptually, the JUnit test framework is a pattern-based 
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framework of programs designed to facilitate the testing of software program 
components.  It allows the programmer to write scenarios to be implemented as 
automated JUnit tests.  One of the advantages of this approach is that once tests are 
written they are repeatable, long lasting, and available for use in other testing situations 
or modified versions of the original testing scenarios.  This enables developers to 
iteratively improve both the program under development and the automated tests used to 
ensure that the program functions as desired/required.  Vlissides states that JUnit has 
three primary goals.  One, provide a framework within which developers will actually 
write tests.  Incorporating common developer tools into JUnit does this.  Two, allow test 
writers to create tests that retain their value over time.  JUnit does this through Java based 
test scenarios that, once written, can be understood and used by other process engineers.   
Three, it has to be possible to leverage existing tests to create new ones (Vlissides, 
Johnson, and Edgar 2011).  Again, JUnit facilitates this through Java-based test scenarios 
that, once created, can be used as the basis for additional scenarios.  
In the context of our statechart-based approach to process modeling, the process 
engineer uses the JUnit testing framework to test components of the process model or the 
complete process model.  JUnit provides a vehicle for runtime execution monitoring of 
the StateRover generated executable representation of the process model.   
StateRover fully integrates the use of statechart assertions.  Drusinsky describes 
three ways of applying assertions: as a component of the testing process, as part of a 
simulation, and as a component of runtime execution monitoring (Drusinsky 2006, 229–
230).  All three of these application methods are available through StateRover by 
leveraging an interface with the JUnit framework. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
In the previous chapter we explained how our process modeling approach can be 
applied to partially automated, human-based, certification and accreditation (C&A) 
processes.  In this chapter, we provide two case studies to demonstrate the application of 
our statechart-based process modeling approach.   These demonstrative exemplars show 
the utility of our approach. 
The first case study examines the Cross Domain Implementation Process (CDIP) 
and the second examines the Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) Workflow.  Early on in our 
research, the CDIP was being developed by the Unified Cross Domain Management 
Office (UCDMO) as the next-generation process for requesting, developing, 
implementing, and certifying and accrediting a cross domain solution.  We applied our 
process modeling approach to the CDIP.  This effort helped refine our approach.   
During the course of our research, the UCDMO transitioned from the CDIP to the 
CDS Workflow process.  These processes are related in that the CDS Workflow process 
is an evolved form of the CDIP.  When UCDMO transitioned from the CDIP to the CDS 
Workflow as the process responsible for governing the request, development, 
implementation and C&A of cross domain solutions, we began to model the CDS 
Workflow process as well.  This effort provided us with a number of benefits: application 
of our statechart-based modeling approach to two separate processes; fully exercising the 
runtime monitoring capabilities of the modeling approach; and validating the ability to 
apply process requirements as embedded assertions and enforce those assertions on an 
executing model of the process. 
The statechart assertions shown in this chapter reflect the typical hard-to-model 
aspects of requirements on human-based processes.  We demonstrate the modeling and 
V&V of several requirements for each modeled process.  Formalizing all possible 
requirements on each process would not demonstrate anything additional and is 
recommended as future work in Section V.B.3 of this document.  A full-scale 
 66 
implementation of all process requirements would include approximately 120 embedded 
statechart assertions for each modeled process. 
We believe the CDIP and CDS Workflow process are particularly well suited for 
use in experimenting with our approach, given that these processes involve human 
decision making, temporal constraints and restraints, nested sub-processes, workflow 
elements and state changes. 
A. CROSS DOMAIN IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
1. Process Selection 
The primary mission of the UCDMO is to support the timely delivery of secure, 
robust, and cost-effective cross domain capabilities and enterprise services that enable 
authorized US Government and strategic partner communities to safely share information 
across security domains (Unified Cross Domain Management Office 2012).  The 
UCDMO has several concurrent initiatives designed to align and federate the 
implementation and support of cross domain solutions (CDS).  The UCDMO recently 
published the following guidance materials on cross domain (CD) implementations of 
information systems—CD Community Roadmap, CD Inventory List, and CD 
Implementation Process (CDIP), all of which are available at the UCDMO Intelink 
website (Unified Cross Domain Management Office 2012).  In this section we show the 
results of applying our modeling approach to the largely human-based CDIP (see Figure 
27), which demonstrates the use of formal methods to specify and reason about a process 
designed to implement cross domain solutions. 
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Figure 27. Cross Domain Implementation Process Informal Diagram 
Encompassed within the CDIP is the Intelligence Community Directive 503 (ICD 
503) C&A process (Director of National Intelligence 2008).  This process is the means by 
which the designated authorities such as the Cross Domain Resolution Board (CDRB) 
decide whether to allow a given CDS to operate.  The UCDMO is not a decision making 
body; rather, it is responsible for the development, coordination, and oversight of the 
CDIP and its successor, the CDS Workflow process.  We view the process for 
developing, implementing, certifying and accrediting cross domain solutions as critical to 
building the evidence necessary for decision makers to weigh the risks of operating a 
given CDS and to make the accreditation decision for the system. 
2. Process Analysis 
In the second step on the road to building a formal, statechart-based process 
model, thorough analysis helps us develop a better understanding of the process under 
examination.  This analysis begins by gathering all available information related to the 
process.  In the case of the CDIP, the process was still in the formative stages and the 
available documentation consisted of the informal flowchart shown in Figure 27 and 
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several conceptual PowerPoint presentations attributable to members of the UCDMO 
team responsible for developing the CDIP (Unified Cross Domain Management Office 
2008). 
The CDIP is designed as a process that is easy for humans to understand and 
follow.  Historically, the field of formal methods was born out of a need to rigorously 
specify and then perform verification and validation on systems, especially in the case of 
security- and safety-critical systems (Monin and Hinchey 2003).  Formal methods tools 
and techniques are based on mathematical theories.  One of the challenges of formally 
modeling a process designed for humans is capturing those portions of the process that 
involve subjective human activities like evaluation and decision making. For example, 
Step 1 “Authorize Request” of the CDIP demonstrates the subjective nature of the 
process (see Figure 28). In this step, a newly initiated cross domain request form (CDRF) 
must be validated and authorized or rejected by a human within the requestor’s 
agency/service CD office—a human-centric activity.  Such activities need to be formally 
specified within the context of the process and we do so using the diamond-shaped visual 
switch artifact shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28. CDIP Step 1 “Authorize Request” 
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Our analysis revealed that the CDIP is a more complicated process than the 
flowchart of Figure 27 makes it appear.  In fact, after evaluating the available 
documentation, we found the CDIP to be a complex, multi-threaded, multi-layered, 
temporally constrained process. 
As prescribed by our process modeling approach, we identified individual threads, 
decision points, and key elements for translation to the type of statechart artifacts used 
when building StateRover models (e.g., states, visual switches).  Of note, the list of 
identified threads only includes those inherent to the process; we do not include instances 
of threads used as an enabler for embedded assertions. 
a. Threads 
During Step 5 – Certification Test, a system is laboratory tested for 
compliance with mandated security requirements.  If a system passes this testing phase it 
then moves to Step 6 – Implement.  At the same time as a system proceeds to Step 6 – 
Implement it is evaluated as to whether it should be included in the CD Baseline Systems 
list.  This evaluation proceeds independent of and concurrent with the system’s 
implementation and subsequent site testing and therefore fits our criteria for identification 
as a thread. 
b. Decision Points 
As described in Section III.C.1 we use Table 5 to manage and track 
decision points for inclusion in the process model. 
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Table 5. CDIP Decision Points 




Decide whether CDS requestor is a DoD 
component. 
bIsDod True, false ☒ 
Determine whether capability exists as 
an enterprise or centralized capability. 
bEntOrCentCapaiblity True, false ☒ 
Decide how to transition a CDS based 
on the associated level of change 
iClassOfChange 1, 2, 3 ☒ 
Decide whether to initiate an appeal if 
CDS request is denied. 
bInitAppeal True, false ☒ 
Should CD request form (CDRF) move 
forward through process after CDRB 
review? 
bCDRF_Proceed True, false ☒ 
Does CDRF need to be revalidated after 
CDRB review? 
bCDRF_Revalidate True, false ☒ 
Does the CD capability already exist in 
a fully implemented version? 
bCapabilityExists True, false ☒ 
Can an existing CD capability be 
modified to meet the requirement? 
bModifyCapability True, false ☒ 
Is a completely new CDS required in 
order to meet the requested need? 
bNewCapability True, false ☒ 
Based on results of laboratory security 
test, decide whether to move CDS to 
next step of CDIP. 
bProceedFwd True, false ☒ 
Decide whether to add CDS as a 
baseline system. 
bAddToBaseline True, false ☒ 
Decide how to proceed based on results 
of ST&E. 
bSTE_Successful True, false ☒ 
What is the result of the accreditation 
process? 
bAccredCD True, false ☒ 
c. Layers 
The CDIP is composed of processes and sub-processes.  Therefore, we 
used statechart hierarchy when building the model.  We determined that two levels of 
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hierarchy are required in order to accurately capture the nested processes within the 
CDIP.  In the diagram of Figure 27, each of Step 3 – Community Approval Via CDRB, 
Step 5 – Certification Test, Step 6/7 – Implement / Site Security Testing, and Step 8 - 
Accreditation were of sufficient complexity to warrant individual articulation as a nested 
process. 
3. Construct Process Model 
In this section, we bring together the results of process selection and analysis to 
articulate the formal process model of the CDIP.  The diagrams of Figure 29 and Figure 
30 show the right and left halves of the top-level view of the full process model.  We 
have split this diagram into two figures for clarity. 
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Figure 29. Top-Level View of Final CDIP Process Model (Right Half) 
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Figure 30. Top-Level View of Final CDIP Process Model (Left Half) 
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However, model development was an iterative process.  By taking advantage of 
our chosen modeling tool’s code generation capability and inherent semantic compliance 
checking routines, we were able to use a build-and-check approach to iteratively 
constructing the model.  The CDIP is a stepwise design, lending itself to building and 
testing in sections.  Throughout model development and with the addition of each new 
step we take two actions designed to ensure the model adheres to the underlying rules for 
semantic correctness: (i) Use the “Diagram/Validate” menu option to initiate 
StateRover’s validation routine and reveal detected errors and (ii) initiate the code 
generation process.  As detailed in Chapter III, diagram validation and code generation 
provide an end-to-end syntactic and semantic check of the model and identify errors.  
Multiple types of errors could be detected through this process such as mistakes made by 
the stakeholders in the formulation of the natural language representations of the process 
and its requirements which get built into the model by the process engineer, errors by the 
process engineer when translating the natural language into the model and its assertions, 
or mistakes by the process engineer when creating the model (e.g., sink states, loops). 
As shown in Figure 31, we initially constructed Steps 0, 1, 2, and a placeholder 
coarse-state for Step 3 (outlined in green).  The visual switch transition [true] from 
bEntOrCentCapability to Step2 – Process_Request will go to Step 4A – 
Designate_Enterprise_Service in the final version of the model.  However, in order to 
pass the syntactic check for both true and false transitions from a visual switch we 
temporarily route the [true] transition (outlined in red) to Step2 – Process_Request as 
shown in Figure 31.  On the right hand side of state Steps_0_1 we positioned a 
placeholder thread, named assertion_thread, which will contain the embedded assertion 
to be placed later in the modeling process. 
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Figure 31. CDIP Steps 0 - 3 Top-level View During Model Development 
Next, we constructed the detailed view of Step 3 (Figure 32).  The capability to 
display Step 3’s single coarse-state placeholder on the diagram of Figure 31 and expand 
that view as shown in Figure 32, demonstrates one of the benefits of hierarchy, that is, 
adjusting the depth and complexity of the view as needed.  Step 3 is characterized by a 
number of questions that must be answered in order to properly route a CDS request into 
the appropriate path for the next step of the process.   
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Figure 32. Step 3–Community_Approval_Via_CDRB 
The three visual switches on the right hand side of Figure 32 represent human 
decisions that determine whether: (i) the requested capability already exist within the 
inventory; (ii) an existing capability can be modified to meet the stated requirement; or 
(iii) authority and funding for development of a new capability is approved in order to 
meet the requirements of the CDS request.   Depending on the answer to each of these 
questions (i.e., true or false) the process will transition to the appropriate section of Step 4 
as designated on the far right hand side of Figure 32 by the off-page references 
to_Step4B, to_Step4C, and to_Step4D.  If it is determined that there is no way to proceed 
forward with developing or acquiring the requested CDS capability then the process 
transitions back to the top-level statechart via Reassess_return_Step_1-1. 
After constructing Step_3 we once again run the validation and code generation 
routines to iteratively ensure the model is semantically and syntactically correct.  We do 
this at each stage of model development. 
 77 
 
Figure 33. CDIP Top-level Development of Steps 4, 5, and 6/7 
The top-level view of Step 4(a, b, c, d), Step 5, and Step 6/7 is shown in Figure 
33.  Again we use coarse states for those steps that will be further articulated as sub-
processes Step 5, Step 6/7, and Step 8.  The detailed view for each of these steps is shown 
in Figure 34, Figure 35, and Figure 36, respectively.  
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Figure 34. Step 5 – Certification Test 
In Step 5 – Certification Test there are two statechart threads.  This construct, in 
conjunction with the transition connector artifact (outlined in red in Figure 34) permits 
the process engineer to enable interaction and transitions between concurrent activities 
within a process.  In this case, after security testing is complete and a decision has been 
made to proceed forward with implementing and site testing a CDS, the process also calls 
for a review of the system to decide if it should be added to the CDS baseline. 
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Figure 35. Step 6/7 – Implement and Perform Site Security Testing 
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Figure 36. Step 8 – Accreditation Decision 
After the construction of each step we validate and generate code to ensure that 
the model is error-free.  If the model is not error-free, the process engineer makes 
corrections as required and then validates the model and generates code again.  This 
process continues until each new section of the model is error-free.   
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Figure 37. CDIP Top-level View Steps 9, 10 
Next, we constructed the final portion of the top-level model, including Step 9 and 
Step 10 (see Figure 37).  From a process engineering perspective, we made a design 
decision to place Step 9 in the top-level of the model.  This helps demonstrate the 
flexibility and scalability of the modeling approach.  If placing Steps 9 and 10 in the top-
level had significantly increased the difficulty of understanding the model or following its 
flow then we would have been able to represent it as a coarse state at the top-level and 
fully articulate it in a separate substatechart as we did for Steps 3, 5, 6/7, and 8.  On the 
right hand side of state Step 9 – Operate_and_Monitor we positioned a placeholder 
thread, named Op_Mon_assert_thread that will contain the embedded assertion to be 
placed later in the modeling process. 
4. Construct Statechart Assertions 
In this section we show two embedded statechart assertions, each designed to 
model and enforce a different natural language requirement.  This demonstrates the 
technical feasibility of applying statechart embedded assertions to the type of partially 
automated human-based C&A processes modeled with our approach.   
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The statechart assertion of Figure 38 is a formal specification of the natural 
language requirement R1: Local approval authority/authorities must ensure that there is 
a valid operational need for CDS. 
 
Figure 38. Statechart Assertion for Requirement R1 
The statechart assertion of Figure 39 is a formal specification of the natural 
language requirement R2: the CDS implementation must remain secure during the 
“operate and monitor” phase of its lifecycle. 
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Figure 39. Statechart Assertion for Requirement R2 
a. Validating Statechart Assertions 
As described in Section III.C.4.b, we use a pattern-based testing 
methodology to help build a body of evidence that our assertions correctly represent the 
intended behaviors.  Figure 40 shows an example of a testing scenario for the assertion of 
Figure 38 to test the obvious success pattern. 
 
Figure 40. Timeline Diagram for “obvious success” Assertion Test Scenario 
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This is a trivial case but important not to overlook.  Using this 
methodology, on several occasions throughout the development process we found the 
need to make corrections based on test results from pattern-based testing scenarios.  For 
example, in the statechart assertion of Figure 38 we initially reversed the placement of 
the LCDO_Reject() and LCDO_Accept() events on their respective transitions.  The 
trivial obvious success based test pattern revealed this error, demonstrating the value of 
exposing process models to a wide range of test scenarios from trivial to complex. 
5. Embed Assertions in Process Model 
In the next phase of our process modeling approach we embed the statechart 
assertions into the process model.  As discussed in Section III.C.5 of this document, the 
process engineer places embedded statechart assertions within the model based on the 
desired scope of the assertion. 
The statechart assertion of Figure 41 is only applicable to activity modeled in 
state Steps_0_1; therefore, to keep it appropriately scoped we have embedded it in a 
thread via the substatechart artifact of our chosen modeling tool as shown in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 41. Steps_0_1 with Embedded Statechart Assertion 
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The statechart assertion for R2, shown in Figure 39, is only applicable to the 
activities and events occurring in Step 9 so it has been embedded within a thread (see 
Figure 42) of this state to maintain the appropriate scope. 
 
Figure 42. Step 9—Operate_and_Monitor – with Embedded Assertion 
6. V&V Process Model 
a. Validation 
In the validation component of our modeling approach, the process 
engineer presents the finalized model to process stakeholders to ensure the model meets 
the expectations and requirements of stakeholders.  This interaction is depicted in Figure 
6 by the dashed line from V&V Process to Process Stakeholder Expectations.  It 
represents a key portion of the feedback loop with stakeholders and facilitates validation 
of the process model.  For the purposes of demonstrating the feasibility of this component 
of our modeling approach, we worked directly with the UCDMO to ensure the completed 
process model met their expectations.  We presented diagrams of our formal model, like 
those presented in this chapter, and discussed the translation process from UCDMO 
supplied process documentation to the process model.  Through informal discussion we 
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asked questions about components of the model to ensure that we fully understood and 
had correctly translated stakeholder intent and requirements into the process model. The 
UCDMO personnel asked questions such as inquiring how the concurrent activities in 
Step 5 would be handled by our modeling approach and whether requirements 
enforcement through assertions could be designed into a long-term process monitoring 
system.  Long-term process monitoring is an open research question that we propose as 
future work in Chapter V of this document. 
b. Verification – Manual Testing 
For manual testing, the process engineer writes Java-based test scripts that 
enact the scenarios he desires to test.  Figure 43 shows a manually generated test case just 
after a test run with a failed assertion.  The green outline contains commands used to 
initiate events and set variables in the process model being tested.  Our chosen modeling 
software provides two types of feedback from the testing process.  The red outline shows 
messages from the executing model and in this case shows the red status message, 
“System found NOT SECURE, take corrective action,” which is generated by the 
statechart assertion CDIP_OP_Mon_Assertion_Statechart upon assertion failure.  The 
blue outline shows JUnit reporting on failed assertions.  This type of testing and the 
associated status messages from the model’s embedded statechart assertions and JUnit 
demonstrate the means by which we are able to ensure process requirements, represented 
by statechart assertions, are enforced at runtime. 
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Figure 43. Manual Testing Example – Failed Assertion 
Figure 44 shows a similar test scenario but this one is set up to ensure the 
embedded assertion of Figure 39 succeeds when we expect it to.  In this case, we have 
removed the line CDIP_Test.SysNotSecure(); so the commands in the green outlined area 
do not drive the statechart assertion, CDIP_OP_Mon_Assertion_Statechart, to a failure 
condition.  Since the assertion did not fail, the red outlined area does not show a failure 
message from the statechart assertion.  The blue outlined area has a green bar, indicating 
that no assertions failed. 
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Figure 44. Manual Testing Example – Successful Assertion 
The test cases we have shown demonstrate one of the methods by which 
we ensure that a process model behaves exactly as expected under specific conditions.  
The other method is through automated testing via runtime execution monitoring. 
c. Verification – Runtime Execution Monitoring 
Runtime execution monitoring provides the process engineer with a means 
of exploring the effect of numerous input sequences on the process model during 
automated testing.  The process engineer is able to adjust test parameters such as number 
of tests, test length, and number of permissible loops, in addition to using the information 
from testing to better understand, debug, maintain, and communicate with other 
engineers, the users, and the stakeholders about a process model.   
Figure 45 and Figure 46 show a portion of the final results of two WTG 
tests runs on the CDIP process model.  In this case, we set the number of tests to 50 and 
we are provided with feedback from the model (e.g., the output of println() statements 
embedded in the model), a listing of states within the model that were not entered during 
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the test run, and a specific listing of which tests encountered one or more failed assertions 
(i.e., “47-failed tests” in Figure 45 and Figure 46).  During automated testing with a large 
number of test runs, we expect most of the tests to have failed assertions since the WTG 
explores the possible paths for given set of inputs.  Depending on what we are attempting 
to test in an automated test run, it may or may not be acceptable to have states not visited 
during test.  For instance, if we wish to determine if the embedded statechart assertions 
fail and succeed for a given set of events and variables we may be able to accomplish this 
without visiting all states.  If we wish to ensure that all states of the model are reachable 
from an input sequence then we would likely increase the number of test runs to ensure 
enough input sequences are presented to the executing model to fully visit all states.  
 
Figure 45. CDIP Test Results Example 1 
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Figure 46. CDIP Test Results Example 2 
Figure 47 shows a portion of the statechart animation results produced 
during the test run of Figure 45.  During model development, we use the textual and 
graphical feedback to debug the model and to ensure that the model behaves as expected 
under a wide variety of input scenarios.   
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Figure 47. Graphic Feedback for CDIP Test Results Example 2 
Visual test feedback helps the process engineer to better understand, 
develop, debug, and maintain the type of C&A processes we are interested in modeling.  
In addition, because visual representations are generally easier for humans to understand, 
they facilitate communication about the process under evaluation among users, 
stakeholders, and process engineers. 
Table 6. Runtime Execution Monitoring Data Collection 
 Test Run # 
Description of Attributes 
1 2 3 4 
Number of tests per run 5 25 50 100 
Failed assertions     
All states visited     
Time to complete test run 15.9s 88.2s 144.2s 346.5s 
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As described in Section III.C.6.c, the data shown in Table 6 provided a 
means of comparing state visitation coverage and processing time across test runs.  For 
this 100-test run the single flowchart box Do_Not_Add_CD_System_to_Baseline was the 
only state/flowchart box not visited.  This prompted us to go back and review that portion 
of the model to ensure the results didn’t indicate a problem with the model.  In this case, 
the location of the Do_Not_Add_CD_System_to_Baseline flowchart box was such that 
the results made sense due to the location of the box relative to the flow of the model 
during automated testing.  
B. CROSS DOMAIN SOLUTION WORKFLOW PROCESS 
1. Process Selection 
The CDS Workflow replaced the UCDMO’s CDIP with the former representing a 
process-based initiative to federate the request, reuse, development, implementation, and 
C&A of cross domain solutions.  The CDS Workflow is a more complex process than its 
predecessor with five major process blocks and four levels of hierarchy.  As the successor 
to the CDIP, this is now the process by which designated authorities such as the Cross 
Domain Resolution Board (CDRB) decide whether to allow a given to CDS operate. 
2. Process Analysis 
In an effort to better document the CDS Workflow process, the UCDMO captured 
elements of it as UML use case (see Figure 48) and activity diagrams (see Figure 49) 
developed in Rational Rose Modeler5.  The use case and activity diagrams were a starting 
point for analyzing and understanding the process, which facilitated the analysis phase of 
our modeling approach. 
                                                 
5 Rational Rose is a commercial UML modeling tool developed by IBM.  Additional information is 
available at http://www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/developer/rose/modeler/. 
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Figure 48. CDS Use Case Diagrams 
The activity diagram shown in Figure 49 is for a sub-process of the larger CDS 
Workflow process.  Activity diagrams are UML artifacts and the process of translating 
them is generally straightforward since activity diagrams can be directly translated to 
statecharts (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004, 62–67).  Each activity diagram represents a sub-
process within the overall CDS Workflow.  Thus one of the challenges was to develop an 
understanding of how the different activity diagrams related to each other in terms of 
processes, sub-processes, and sequencing in order to provide us with the necessary 
information to build a model reflective of the actual CDS Workflow.  Most of the CDS 
sub-processes had been documented in activity diagrams.  However, the only 
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documentation for the “Operate and Monitor” sub-process was a single point on the use 
case diagrams of Figure 48.  This prompted us to hold further discussions with the 
UCDMO representatives in order to determine the flow, elements, and desired behaviors 
of this sub-process.  This demonstrates one of the challenges of applying formal methods 
tools and technique to processes operating in real-world environments. 
The use case diagrams of Figure 48 were particularly helpful for developing the 
proper sequencing of sub-processes within the overall CDS Workflow. 
 
Figure 49. Activity Diagram for Sub-Process Titled “Initiate Reqest” 
As prescribed by our process modeling approach, we identified individual threads, 
decision points, and key elements for translation to the type of statechart artifacts used 
when building StateRover models (e.g., states, visual switches). 
a. Threads 
The CDS Workflow is a complex process with several sub-processes that 
have concurrent activities occurring.  As discussed in Section III.A.a, we model 
concurrent activity using the statechart thread construct. 
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The vertical or horizontal parallel lines in an activity diagram denote 
swimlanes which provide a way to group activities performed by the same actor or to 
group activities in a single thread (Ambler 2005).  We observed that in the UCDMO 
diagrams, groups of related activities have been grouped together within swimlanes, with 
some of these activities happening concurrently.  We translated the swimlanes in each 
activity diagram to threads within appropriate states in the process model. 
Using this approach, the activity diagram of Figure 50 shows two separate 
sets of activity.  This will be modeled with two separate threads. 
 
Figure 50. Initiate Request Activity Diagram 
On the right hand side of Figure 50, Review Request (+) represents the 
sub-process shown in Figure 51.  This activity diagram uses horizontal swimlanes to 
denote grouped activities; however, concurrent activities are taking place within each set 
of swimlanes.  In this case, we model the activities within each set of swimlanes in a 
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single state and use three threads and four threads for the top and bottom sets of 
swimlanes, respectively, to separate concurrent activity. 
 
Figure 51. Review Request Activity Diagram 
The Process CDS Request activity diagram of Figure 52 shows that 
processing a CDS request involves four separate sets of activities.  We model this with 
four separate threads. 
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Figure 52. Process CDS Request Activity Diagram 
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Figure 53. Implement CDS Request Activity Diagram 
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Implementing a CDS has five separate sets of activity occurring, as shown 
in Figure 53.  We model this with five separate threads. 
b. Decision Points 
Next, we examine the CDS Workflow process to determine decision 
points and use Table 7 to manage and track them. 
Table 7. CDS Workflow Decision Points 




Decide whether new network 
connection is required to satisfy CDS 
request. 
bNewNetConnectRqrd True, false ☒ 
Did CDS requestor enter all necessary 
data on CDS request? 
bAllDataEntered True, false ☒ 
Is CDS requirement valid (CD Officer 
Validator)? 
bValidatedRqrmt True, false ☒ 
Has all technical information on CDS 
request been verified? 
bTechInfoVerified  ☒ 
Decide whether the “best-fit” CDS 
meets the requested requirement. 
bCanMeetReq True, false ☒ 
Does the “best-fit” CDS require 
modification to meet requirements? 
bisModRqrd True, false ☒ 
Does CDS decision-making body agree 
with recommendations and findings? 
bAgreeRecommFind True, false ☒ 
Does CD Officer Validator accept 
recommended issue resolution? 
bAcceptRes True, false ☒ 
Can threshold requirements be met with 
proposed configuration? 
bThrshldRqrmtsMet True, false ☒ 
Do technical issues prevent meeting the 
requirement? 
bTechIssues True, false ☒ 
After reviewing risk assessment, does 
CDS have interim approval to connect 
for testing? 
bIntApprovConnctTstng True, false ☒ 
Are certification, testing, and evaluation 
required? 
bCTE_Req True, false ☒ 
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Did CDS pass offline testing? bPassOfflineTest True, false ☒ 
Is approval granted to connect 
implemented CDS to network(s)? 
bApprovetoConnect True, false ☒ 
Is CDS outside of risk threshold? bOutsideRiskThresh True, false ☒ 
c. Layers 
The CDS Workflow is composed of processes and sub-processes.  Upon 
analyzing the process we determined that it would be best to represent the process using 
four levels of hierarchy.  Each of the “Initiate Request,” “Process Request,” “Implement 
CDS,” and “Operate and Monitor” sub-processes were of sufficient complexity to 
warrant individual articulation as a nested process at a second level of hierarchy.  In 
addition, the “Review Request” sub-process of “Initiate Request” was sufficiently 
complex for individual articulation at a third level of hierarchy. 
3. Construct Process Model 
In this section, we bring together the results of process selection an analysis to 
articulate the formal process model of the CDS Workflow.  The diagram of Figure 54 
shows the top-level view of the final process model. 
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Figure 54. Top-level Statechart Model of CDS Workflow Process 
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Throughout model development and with the addition of each new step we 
perform two actions designed to ensure the model adheres to the underlying rules for 
semantic correctness: (i) Use the “Diagram/Validate” menu option to initiate 
StateRover’s validation routine and reveal detected errors (ii) initiate the code generation 
process.  As detailed in Chapter III.C, the diagram validation and code generation provide 
an end-to-end semantic check of the model and identify errors. 
For this process, our analysis indicated that the top-level of the model would be 
relatively simple in terms of the number of states and transitions.  We initially 
constructed the model shown in Figure 55.  This portion of the model ended up being 
very close to the final top-level view. 
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Figure 55. CDS Workflow Top-level View During Model Development 
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Next, we constructed in turn each of the detail views for the Initiate_Coarse, 
Process_Coarse, Implement_Coarse, and OpMon_Coarse states of Figure 55. 
The detail view of Initiate_Coarse is shown in Figure 56.  The middle thread is a 
placeholder for an embedded statechart assertion to be placed later in the modeling 
process.  Just as occurred when constructing the CDIP process model, we run the 
validation and code generation routines at each step of model building to iteratively 
ensure the model is semantically and syntactically correct.  We do this at each stage of 
model development. 
 
Figure 56. Initiate_Coarse 
The right hand thread contains a coarse state, Review_Request, the details of 
which are shown in Figure 57.  This sub-process is fully contained within the 
Initiate_Coarse state and therefore decomposes to the third level of hierarchy.  We 
discussed complexity and layering in Chapter III of this document.  Modeling of the 
second and third levels of hierarchy in this manner is an example of how we are able to 




Figure 57. Review_Request 
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Next we constructed the detailed view of state Process_Coarse.  This state has 
four separate threads, seven decision points, a mix of workflow and statechart elements, 
and a number of transitions between the threads.  It was the most complex sub-process 
that we had modeled.  Running the validation and code generation routines was 
particularly helpful to ensure the semantic and syntactic correctness as we iteratively built 
it.  The detailed view of Process_Coarse is shown in Figure 58. 
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Figure 58. Process_Coarse 
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The next state modeled was Implement_Coarse.  This sub-process has five threads 
and four decision points.  As with the previous sub-process, our modeling approach of 
iterative validation and code generation helped us rapidly construct this portion of the 
model with no syntactic or semantic errors.  This sub-process is shown in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59. Implement_Coarse 
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The final detail view developed was for OpMon_Coarse sub-process.  The 
detailed view of OpMon_Coarse is shown in Figure 60. 
 
Figure 60. OpMon_Coarse 
We intend to embed a statechart assertion in OpMon_Coarse later in the modeling 
process so we have positioned a placeholder thread to be filled in during the “Embed 
Assertions in Process Model” phase of our modeling approach. 
4. Construct Statechart assertions 
In this section we show three embedded assertions statecharts, each designed to 
model and enforce a different natural language requirement.  This demonstrates the 
technical feasibility of applying statechart embedded assertions to the type of partially 
automated human-based C&A processes modeled with our approach. 
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The statechart assertion of Figure 61 is a formal specification of the natural 
language requirement R1: Each of the impact levels (Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability) must be set to one of the following: low, moderate, high. 
 
Figure 61. Statechart Assertion for Requirement R1 
The statechart assertion of Figure 62 is a formal specification of the natural 
language requirement R2: Review of the CDS request must be completed within 100 time 
units of the time review begins.  This statechart assertion demonstrates the ability to apply 
enforceable temporal constraints to our model. 
 
Figure 62. Statechart Assertion for Requirement R2 
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The statechart assertion of Figure 63 is a formal specification of the natural 
language requirement R3: The CDS implementation must remain secure during the 
“operate and monitor” phase of its lifecycle. 
 
Figure 63. Statechart Assertion for Requirement R3 
5. Embed Assertions in Process Model 
The next step in our process modeling approach is to embed the statechart 
assertions into the process model.  As discussed in Section III.C.5 of this document, the 
process engineer places embedded statechart assertions within the model based on the 
desired scope of the assertion. 
The statechart assertion of Figure 64 is only applicable to activity modeled in 
state Requestor_Initiate; therefore, to keep it appropriately scoped it is embedded in a 
thread within this state via the sub-statechart artifact of our chosen modeling tool as 
shown in Figure 65. 
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Figure 64. State Requestor_Initiate with Embedded Assertion 
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The statechart assertion for R2, shown in Figure 62, is only applicable to the 
activities and events occurring in state Assess_Request so it has been embedded within a 
thread (see Figure 65) of this state to maintain the appropriate scope. 
 
Figure 65. State Assess_Request with Embedded Statechart Assertion 
The statechart assertion for R3, shown in Figure 63, is only applicable to the 
activities and events occurring in state Op_Monitor so it has been embedded within a 
thread (see Figure 66) of this state to maintain the appropriate scope. 
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Figure 66. State Op_Monitor with Embedded Statechart Assertion  
6. V&V Process Model 
a. Validation 
The process engineer presents the finalized model to process stakeholders 
to ensure the model meets the expectations and requirements of stakeholders.  This 
interaction is depicted in Figure 6 by the dashed line from V&V Process to Process 
Stakeholder Expectations.  It represents a key portion of the feedback loop with 
stakeholders and facilitates validation of the process model.  For the purposes of 
demonstrating the feasibility of this component of our modeling approach, we worked 
directly with UCDMO to ensure the completed process model met their expectations. 
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We presented our model to the UCDMO in a similar fashion to what we 
described in Section IV.A.6.a for the CDIP.  We informally presented diagrams of the 
formal model and discussed the translation process from UCDMO supplied process 
documentation to the process model.  The resulting dialogue provided validation that our 
design met stakeholder intent.  We used this feedback loop to ensure that the “Operate 
and Monitor” component of the model, mentioned in Section IV.A.2 met the UCDMO 
expectations.  Due to the lack of documentation available for analysis of “Operate and 
Monitor” it was particularly helpful to have direct input from the process stakeholders to 
improve the process model. 
b. Verification – Manual Testing 
We use the same process for manual testing as described for the CDIP in 
Section IV.A.6.b of this document.  Manual testing allows the process engineer to focus 
on and test specific scenarios to examine how a given set of variable values, timings, and 
events will affect the model during execution.    In this section we use manually 
generated test cases to demonstrate how statechart assertions embedded in the CDS 
Workflow enforce requirements on the process model. 
The test case shown in Figure 67 is designed to test the assertion 
CheckImpactLevelsAssertion to ensure that the assertion does not fail when it should 
succeed.  This assertion, shown in Figure 61 is designed enforce the natural language 
requirement R1: Each of the impact levels (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) must 
be set to one of the following: low, moderate, high.  In the green outlined area of Figure 
67, we assign values of High, High, and Low to the Confidentiality, Availability, and 
Integrity impact levels, respectively.  In the red outlined area of Figure 67, the message 
“Impact Levels Assertion Entered” shows that the assertion was entered while the blue 
outlined area shows that no assertions failed during the test run. 
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Figure 67. Successful Manual Test of CheckImpactLevelsAssertion  
For those test runs with animation activated, our modeling tool provides 
additional visual feedback as shown in Figure 68.  In this case the assertion’s failure 
criteria were not met so the statechart assertion remained in the Start state throughout the 
test run. 
 
Figure 68. Assertion CheckImpactLevelsAssertion Successful Test Run 
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The next test results show the indicators for a failed test run.  In Figure 69, 
the green outlined area shows that we set the Integrity impact level to “not_set.”  This 
caused the CheckImpactLevelsAssertion embedded assertion to fail and print the status 
message “One or more impact levels have not been set.” in the red outlined area and to 
throw an AssertionFailedError in the blue outlined area of Figure 69. 
 
Figure 69. Failed Manual Test of CheckImpactLevelsAssertion 
In the lower portion of Figure 70, we see a transition from the Start state 
to the Assert_Fail flowchart box and on to a terminal state.  This occurred because one of 
the impact levels was not set in the CDS Workflow model, causing a transition to the 
flowchart box Levels_Not_Set which is shown by the orange outlined box in the upper 
portion of Figure 70.   
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Figure 70. Assertion CheckImpactLevelsAssertion Failed Test Run 
When we write manual test cases, we are able to test process flow and 
adherence to process requirement written as embedded assertions by specifying events 
and setting variables to move through the executing process in a specific way.  This 
ensures that the model behaves as expected for each test scenario. 
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c. Verification – Runtime Execution Monitoring 
In this section we show the results of automated testing of the CDS 
Workflow process model.  Runtime execution monitoring provides a means of exploring 
the effect of numerous input sequences on the process model during automated testing 
and verifying that the model behaves as expected across the range of inputs.  During 
model construction we insert code to print variable values and status messages at runtime.  
These messages are delivered throughout execution of each test.  This helps us ensure 
that the model behaves precisely as specified since we are able to compare variable 
values for a test run to the testing results based on those values.  An example of this can 
be seen in the blue outline of Figure 71.  The Confidentiality impact level is “not_set” 
which should cause the assertion CheckImpactLevelsAssertion to fail and it does, as we 
see from the status message in red “CheckImpactLevelAssertion: One or more impact 
levels have not been set.” 
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Figure 71. WTG Output for 50-Test Run 
Depending on our testing goals and the outcome of test runs, we adjust test 
parameters such as number of tests, test length, number of permissible loops in order to 
ensure all elements that we wish to examine have been tested.  The green outline of 
Figure 71 shows us that all three of the assertions in our model failed during this 50-test 
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run.  We expect this to occur as the WTG explores the execution paths for a large number 
of input sequences over the course of fifty tests.  
C. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 
As we developed the CDIP and CDS Workflow models there were some key 
lessons learned that will facilitate the improvement of further research into the modeling 
of partially automated human-based security-related processes. 
1. Code Generation 
The code generation facility turned out to be a key means of ensuring end-to-end 
syntactic and semantic consistency of our model.  Note that during model development 
we do not focus on code generation from the standpoint of creating usable code as would 
be the case when developing software-based systems.  Instead, we are interested in the 
rigorous syntax and semantics checking that is an inherent part of StateRover’s code 
generation module.  If code generation is unable to complete successfully this equates to 
a syntactic or semantic inconsistency with the model and drives the process engineer to 
investigate and correct the source of the error before continuing with model development. 
2. Source Material 
During the “Process Analysis” phase of our modeling approach, the process 
engineer develops an understanding of the process under examination based on the 
materials provided by the stakeholders of the process.  This material may be abundant or 
scarce and could include things such as interviews with users or stakeholders, focus 
groups, informal diagrams, or semi-formal diagrams.  We modeled two processes during 
the course of this research.  The source material differed significantly between the two 
processes and we found in the case of the CDS Workflow that having the UCDMO 
provided activity diagrams and use cases facilitated our understanding of model. 
If provided a similar set of activity diagrams for any process, it would facilitate an 
expeditious analysis of the process.  However, the notion of “garbage in, garbage out” 
applies here.  In other words, if it is the case that either the process diagrams or 
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documentation is inaccurate or incomplete, we believe that analysis could end up taking 
longer or result in unfounded conclusions due to the original diagrams leading the 
analysis down one or more false paths.  Process diagrams are not a requirement for 
analysis but instead a facilitator.  In the absence of diagrams or other forms of 
documentation, the process engineer engaged in formalizing a process is likely to employ 
a variety of methods to develop a full understanding of the process such as observation of 
the process in action, and interviews with stakeholders.  Based on our experience with the 
two processes modeled in this work, we suggest that inaccurate, inconsistent, or non-
existent process documentation would significantly increase the process-analysis timeline 
due to the need for end-to end-process analysis. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we demonstrated the development of a systematic approach to 
formally modeling human-in-the-loop security analysis and decision-making processes as 
well as the use of UML statecharts and statechart assertions for engineering, modeling, 
and V&V of these processes.  The contributions described below support this research. 
1. Software Engineering 
We contributed to software engineering by introducing a novel way for software 
to automate a new domain, that being the process-modeling engineering of high-level, 
human-based processes.  We do this through the generation of an executable process 
model and executable assertions.  We then use software to enact these executable 
representations as a means of process automation.   
2. Process-modeling Engineering 
We developed a systematic approach to formally modeling, validating and 
verifying high-level human-based processes (shown in Figure 72).  These processes can 
be challenging to model because of hard-to-capture elements such as human decision-
making, sequencing, and concurrent activities.  We applied some of the tools and 
techniques from software engineering to provide an end-to-end means of modeling and 
V&V of these processes using the same formalism.  This provides a framework for the 
specification of security processes and computer-assisted V&V of the specifications.  
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Figure 72. Statechart-Based Formal Modeling Approach 
We developed a set of desirable attributes to guide the choice of a formal 
language and associated computer-based tools that would support our modeling 
approach.  We examined a number of formal languages and tools in the context of these 
attributes and showed that UML statecharts and statechart assertions in conjunction with 
the tools available for this formal language provide us with the necessary vehicle for 
building a formal process model as well as specifying and enforcing requirements on the 
model. 
Our approach includes development of an executable version of the modeled 
process and the process requirements models as statechart assertions.  Once developed, 
this executable model provides us with a runtime view of the process.  We use formal 
methods tools and techniques originally designed for the engineering of reactive 
hardware and software systems as a means to monitor the process in execution for 
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requirements satisfaction.  The addition of runtime monitoring, in conjunction with 
embedded statechart-based assertions, offer the process engineer an unprecedented ability 
to levy requirements on a human-based process and enforce those requirements while the 
process is in execution. 
3. Case Studies 
We demonstrate the application of our systematic modeling approach through two 
case studies.  These two cases represent hard process modeling problems and encompass 
a large portion of the hard-to-capture elements mentioned above.  By automating the 
process engineering we can capture and V&V the processes.  The two case studies are 
based on real-world processes used by the UCDMO for the development, 
implementation, and C&A of CDS. 
4. Real-world Impact 
We provided feedback to the UCDMO on process errors discovered through the 
case studies, resulting in corresponding changes to the real-world process for requesting, 
developing, implementing, certifying and accrediting cross domain solutions.  This 
demonstrates how the embedded feedback loop in the process modeling approach can 
directly contribute to process engineering and improvement of real-world processes. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
More work is needed to further validate our modeling approach.  We have applied 
our approach to two processes in the security analysis and decision-making domain and 
submit that it would improve process-modeling efforts in other domains.  In addition, 
there needs to be additional research to enable the long-term runtime monitoring of an 
executable process model in direct support of the real-world application of the process.  
In other words, it would be desirable to provide the users of the approach with the 
capability to execute process models for sufficiently long periods of time such that the 
modeled processes terminate naturally (i.e., processes that have a definitive end-point or 
product which causes the process to end) or run indefinitely (e.g., safety processes that 
involve continuous checking of health and status of the manual and automated functions 
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of a process-control application).  Future research is needed on the optimal placement and 
use of embedded assertions within a statechart-based formal process model.  Follow-on 
research also needs to examine additional modeling tool capabilities to facilitate the 
modeling of human-in-the-loop processes. 
1. Improving Workflows for Surgical Procedures 
In this research, we apply the modeling approach to partially automated, human-
based, C&A processes.  There are also opportunities in the field of medical workflow 
specifications for further validation of our modeling approach. 
Since 1993, the DoD has transformed health care delivery in its use of 
information technology to automate patient data documentation.  The Department uses an 
enterprise-wide medical and dental clinical information system that generates, maintains, 
and provides 24-hour secure online access to electronic medical records (EMR).  This 
system of EMRs enhances patient safety for more than nine million beneficiaries, with 
“one patient, one record.”  It provides a legible and longitudinal clinical record that 
includes drug interaction alerts, patient allergy notifications, and wellness reminders to 
enhance health care delivery. (Charles, Harmon, and Jordan 2005) 
Under the rubric of the Military Health System (MHS), DoD operates state-of-
the-art hospitals and clinics, battlefield, and forward-deployed temporary medical 
facilities worldwide.  MHS provides care to over 19,000 inpatients and 1.7 million 
outpatients each week (Charles, Harmon, and Jordan 2005).  The EMR is a primary 
enabler for the improvement in safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of healthcare and as a 
fully integrated component of the military healthcare paradigm.  Through the integration 
of Health Information Technology (HIT) such as the EMR, the DoD is searching for 
ways to improve the quality and efficiency of care it provides to members of the military.  
In addition to improving EMRs, the DoD has specified, using natural language and 
simple flowcharts, the process workflows for performing medical procedures.  These 
procedures, such as surgeries, can be performed manually or semi-automatically and may 
involve both human decision-making and robotically controlled elements. 
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Figure 73. Example Surgical Procedure Workflow (From Yu et al. 2011)  
Yu, Varga, Wijesekera, Stavrou, and Singhal are investigating the improvement 
of surgical procedure workflows (example shown in Figure 73) and surgical electronic 
medical records (S-EMR) through the application of use/misuse cases and time-out 
points.  They describe workflows for surgical procedures that incorporate both EMRs and 
more pedestrian means such as paper-based checklists.  They discuss the inclusion of 
time-out points as a means of reducing injury and casualty rates during surgical 
procedures.  Time-out points provide a controlled pause in the medical procedure, 
affording the surgical team time to check a pre-defined condition before proceeding to 
the next step.  They propose the architecture shown in Figure 74 for enforcing time-out 
points in workflows as a means of ensuring the rigorous application of time-out points 
throughout the procedure. (Yu et al. 2011). 
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Figure 74. Time-out Point Enforceable Architecture (From Yu et al. 2011) 
Improving safety and reducing error rates in medical procedures is an important 
area of research to DoD and to the medical community at large.  We propose that future 
researchers use DoD medical workflow specifications to further validate our approach to 
applying computer-aided formal V&V of process workflows.  We also propose that the 
runtime execution monitoring of embedded assertions, used as a requirements-
enforcement mechanism in our modeling approach, could be used as the basis for a Time-
out Point Manager (TPM). 
2. Runtime Execution Monitoring – Long-term Approach 
We demonstrated a process modeling approach that supports V&V of the 
modeled process through runtime execution monitoring and the enforcement of 
embedded assertions.  Further work is needed to support the monitoring and enforcement 
of process requirements throughout a process lifecycle.  We believe the approach 
described in this research could form the basis for an enforcement engine that ensures a 
real-world manifestation of the modeled process adheres to process requirements.  The 
TPM described in the previous section is an example of a requirements enforcement 
mechanism that would operate in conjunction with the real-world execution of a process. 
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3. Full-scale Employment of Embedded Assertions 
We demonstrated the use of several embedded statechart assertions to model and 
enforce process requirements.  We believe that many modeled processes would have a 
large number of stakeholder requirements, translating to a large number of embedded 
assertions in the process model.  Future research needs to further examine full-scale 
employment of embedded assertions to model and enforce all of these process 
requirements.  In a full-scale deployment, it would be important to determine a priori 
whether the enforcement of embedded assertions introduces a performance penalty and if 
so, how much of one.  We did not see any appreciable runtime performance penalties 
when adding statechart assertions to our models; however, it may be the case that 
working with a large number of assertions would deteriorate runtime execution 
monitoring performance. 
4. Validation Using External Assertions 
We explored the use of embedded assertions statecharts as a requirements 
enforcement mechanism on models of partially automated human-based security-related 
processes.  Embedded statecharts assertions, as the name implies, monitor and enforce 
“from the inside” of the modeled process.  This approach was appropriate to our research 
since we modeled both the assertions and process models in the same language, using the 
same toolset. 
Future research should investigate using external assertions and assertion 
repositories as a means of monitoring “from the outside” of the modeled process.  
Drusinky introduced the concepts and provided usage examples of external assertion 
repositories (Drusinsky et al. 2008; Drusinsky 2011, 58–79).  This approach would likely 
enable the use of differing tools, techniques, and languages for the process model and the 
assertions used to enforce requirements on the model. 
5. Additional Modeling Tool Capabilities 
The StateRover modeling tool used in this research satisfied the list of minimum 
desirable attributes detailed in Section III.A.1.  Future research needs to examine 
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continued development of tools to support the modeling of decision-making processes.  
In Section III.C.6.c we discussed data collection and analysis related to runtime execution 
modeling.  It would have been helpful to have a robust, automated data collection and 
reporting mechanism built into the modeling tool to collect data such as the length of 
time for each test run, number of assertions that passed and the number that failed in each 
test run, and the number of model states not visited.  We manually collected this data and 
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